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ABSTRACT
The Canadian federal government used a civil defence program 
to sustain public support for World War Two and afterwards for a 
defence policy based on nuclear weapons.
The successful implementation of civil defence measures 
depended upon the public's perception of their credibility. During 
the Second World War, enduring and widespread participation in 
Canadian civil defence activities suffered because the likelihood 
of an enemy attack was perceived as being too remote. As Allied 
victory became more apparent, civil defence was dropped from the 
government agenda and did not re-emerge until after 1949, when the 
Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb.
Civil defence, responding to the perceived threat of an enemy 
attack, was practiced during the Cold War as part of the military's 
strategy of nuclear deterrence. Three reasons are identified for 
public acquiescence and support for a defence policy based on 
nuclear weapons: censorship of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, political restructuring of the post-war international 
order, and public association of communism with "the enemy." These 
three issues provided a rationale for a re-emergence of civil 
defence measures in Canada.
An analysis of civil defence pamphlets, municipal survival 
plans, and mock attack exercises show how civil defence helped 
convince people that it was possible to survive a nuclear war by 
minimizing the danger from radioactive fallout and its associated 
health hazards. However, the credibility of civil defence measures 
was undermined by the 1954 hydrogen bomb detonation, code named 
BRAVO, which declassified the occurrence of widespread radioactive 
fallout. As the dangers of radioactive fallout became better known 
the federal government increasingly emphasized the individual's 
responsibility to provide for his or her own survival. A review of 
civil defence policies in Canadian news magazines (1950-1965) shows 
a growing public resistance for evacuation and shelters as 
radioactivity weakens the belief in the possibility of surviving a 
nuclear war.
Canada's civil defence programme was carefully manufactured 
for very purposeful utilitarian reasons; to demystify an atomic 
bombing without discussing the human cost. Civil defence 
strengthened the idea that nuclear weapons could provide for 
national security. Through civil defence organizations and 
preparations, public participation was co-opted in favour of 
nuclear war. By appearing to provide civilians with the means to 
protect themselves during an attack and the resources to meet their 
needs in the aftermath of a nuclear war, support was increased for 
nuclear deterrence.
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INTRODUCTION
As an instrument of war, the new but still frail aircraft had 
proven its effectiveness during the First World War, when German 
air raids over London had significantly upset British morale. 
Initially, the public responded to aerial bombardments with poor 
worker efficiency, mass hysteria, and rioting. The devastating 
effects of air raids was re-affirmed during the 1930s with Japan's 
bombing of China, Italy's bombing of Ethiopia, Germany's bombing of 
Spain and Britain's bombing of Somalia and Iraq. Those who became 
adults during the 1930s "expected" war to include the aeroplane 
dropping bombs onto cities.^ The impact of the warplane on society 
was adeptly described by philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in The 
Reprieve, the second volume of his trilogy Roads to Freedom. Sartre 
noted that both psychologically and physically, the bomber had 
taken away the medieval impenetrability of the stone wall. Against 
"ten-thousand-pounder bombs," no one could feel secure. For the 
urban dweller, security had "vanished" under the city's "hundred 
tons of stone." As Sartre was quick to realize, people were 
"wandering about among poised a v a l a n c h e s . The city had become a 
trap.
From a military perspective, countering speculative fears and 
sustaining public support for a war was deemed possible by keeping 
morale high. The morale factor was not a new concept in war plans. 
As military historian Lawrence Freedman noted, the importance of
^Eric Hobsbawm, The Aae of Extremes; The Short Twentieth 
Century 1914-1991 (London; Abacus, 1994), p. 35.
^Jean-Paul Sartre, The Roads to Freedom, vol. 2; The Reprieve, 
trans. Eric Sutton (Suffolk; The Chaucer Press, 1945), p. 21.
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esprit de corps had long been recognized, but aerial warfare was 
dimming the distinction between military and civilian society. 
Victory was no longer simply a test of military strength and morale 
now that the civilian population could be threatened with 
indiscriminate death. Militarists such as Italy's Giulo Douhet 
(1869-1930) reasoned that if people could be brought to suffer from 
a complete societal breakdown, then, acting from the instinct of 
self-preservation, they would rebel against their government and 
demand an end to the war.^ Under such circumstances, "[c]ivilian 
suffering might be a cause of defeat - not just a consequence."* 
Maintaining public morale in the face of terror bombing was the 
objective of civil defence measures.
Civil defence consisted of municipal preparations which would 
facilitate the protection of the public in anticipation of an 
aerial attack. Known to some as the "fourth arm" of the military, 
civil defence was intended to mitigate terror by teaching people 
what to expect and how to respond. The success of civil defence 
ultimately rested with individuals who were expected voluntarily to 
adopt civil defence measures for the safety of their own life and 
property. Assistance would come from ordinary municipal services 
such as fire, police, health, public utility, welfare and 
transportation; but it was the duty of individuals to arrange for 
their own personal survival. Civil defence was premised on
3por an overview of the early developments to the theory of 
strategic bombardment see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of 
Nuclear strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 7-9.
*Ibid.. p. 8.
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protecting the public before an attack occurred and as such was 
known as a passive defence. Defence of the country from an attack 
was the responsibility of the armed forces and was known as active 
defence.
In this thesis I argue that civil defence was used by the 
Canadian federal government to sustain public support for World War 
Two and afterwards for a defence policy based on nuclear weapons. 
The successful implementation of civil defence measures depended 
upon the public's perception of their credibility. In Chapter One, 
I argue that during the Second World War, enduring and widespread 
participation in Canadian civil defence activities suffered because 
the likelihood of an enemy attack was perceived as being too 
remote. In the public's mind, the need to implement protective 
measures could not be rationalized by the threat of an aerial 
attack. As Allied victory became more apparent, civil defence was 
dropped from the government agenda and did not re-emerge until 
after 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb 
and the notion of immense physical destruction inflicted 
unexpectedly upon a defenseless people caught in horror-struck 
panic became a possibility.
Civil defence, responding to the perceived threat of an enemy 
attack, was practiced during the Cold War as part of the military's 
strategy of nuclear deterrence. Preparatory measures were expected 
to boost the morale of the civilian population and dampen the 
resolve of the enemy to launch an attack on city centers. Nuclear 
deterrence ultimately rested on the plausible risk of a nuclear
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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war. Underlying this credibility was the assumption that people 
would only accept a policy of nuclear deterrence if they could be 
assured that a nuclear attack on their own cities would not be too 
costly.
In Chapter Two, I identify three reasons for publiv 
acquiescence and support for a defence policy based on nuclear 
weapons: censorship of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, political restructuring of the post-war international 
order, and public association of communism with "the enemy." These 
three issues provided a rationale for a re-emergence of civil 
defence measures in Canada.
The issue of censorship is examined in relation to the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In North America, information 
about the aftermath of the two bombs passed through the United 
States' Defence Department prior to public release. Exceptionally 
tight control of the details allowed for the atomic bomb to be 
portrayed as just another, albeit more powerful, conventional 
weapon, while the dangers to human health from radiation exposure 
were suppressed. Without censorship of the atomic bombings, it 
would have been difficult to create and then maintain a defence 
policy based on nuclear weapons because people would not have been 
assured of humanity's survival. The sheer lack of uncensored 
information on the atomic bomb and its known effects allowed the 
Canadian government, through the civil defence organization, to 
assure the Canadian public that they could actually be protected 
against an atomic attack. So successful was the initial distortion
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of information on the atomic bomb that as late as 1961, civil 
defence officials were minimizing the danger of radioactivity to 
human life. In part, this was possible because the prevalence of 
the idea of mutually assured destruction was not popularized until 
the late 1960s when critics of the US Secretary of Defence Robert 
McNamara seized upon the acronym to denounce the rationale of 
nuclear deterrence.
Canada's military participation in regional and bilateral 
defence organizations required that the public associate national 
security with nuclear weapons. Canadian security was identified 
with keeping secret the United States' knowledge of how to make an 
atomic bomb. The idea of national security was wrapped-up in the 
notion of exclusive knowledge and prevented Canada from adopting a 
more independent stance at the United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission. When, through the Gouzenko Affair, it was revealed that 
spies were trying to obtain the atomic secret for the Soviet Union, 
the threat to national security was quickly associated with 
communism. By creating an external enemy, members in the defence 
alliance of NATO were able to promote a strategy of nuclear 
deterrence, and through deterrence, depict the atomic bomb as the 
protector of life.
In Chapters Three and Four, I show how the civil defence 
program helped to convince people that it was possible to survive 
a nuclear war and reconstruct society, making nuclear deterrence a 
viable military policy. Chapter Three explores how the civil 
defence program was implemented through survival planning, and how
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the denial of death from radiation exposure was central to 
obtaining public participation. Civil defence propaganda presented 
an atomic bomb attack as a localized disaster, the outcome being 
not much different than that of a conventional bomb. With the right 
knowledge, civilians were told they could save themselves from an 
atomic bomb attack. In Chapter Four, I look at the various national 
civil defence policies, namely evacuation and private, public, and 
government shelters, as they were depicted in the Canadian media. 
Many of the magazine articles show a growing public resistance to 
civil defence policies as the hydrogen bomb, the "missile gap," and 
the ensuing nuclear arms race weakened public belief in the 
possibility of surviving a nuclear war.
Canada's "national survival escapade" (a term coined by 
Desmond Morton)® was carefully manufactured for very purposeful 
utilitarian reasons; to demystify an atomic bombing without 
discussing the human cost. Civil defence strengthened the idea that 
nuclear weapons could provide for national security. The civil 
defence program helped to forge consensus about the meaning of 
security by suggesting to the public that a nuclear war was 
manageable if people made appropriate arrangements. Through civil 
defence organizations and preparations, public participation was 
co-opted in favour of nuclear war. By appearing to provide 
civilians with the means to protect themselves during an attack and
^Desmond Morton, Canada and War; A Military and Political 
History (Toronto; Butterworths, 1981), p. 208.
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the resources to meet their needs in the aftermath of a nuclear 
war, support was increased for nuclear deterrence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER ONE 
The Origins of civil Defence in Canada
By the mid 1930s, technological advances in aviation, 
especially in aircraft carriers and the long-range bomber (which 
was now capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean with only one 
refuelling stop) meant that air raids could also threaten the 
security of Canada. Worried over the possibility of being drawn 
into another European war, Canada's Chiefs of Staff re-evaluated 
the state of their defenses and found them "impoverished."® In May 
of 1935, Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton sounded the alarm bell. In 
a confidential memorandum prepared for government, he noted that 
there was "not a single modern anti-aircraft gun of any sort in 
Canada;" neither was there an aircraft "of a type fit to employ in 
active operations," nor a bomb that could be dropped from an 
aircraft.7 The response from government was to create a sub­
committee of Cabinet, known as the Canadian Defence Committee 
(later known as the Defence Committee of the Cabinet). At its 
inaugural meeting, held on August 20, 1936, Major General E.C. 
Ashton, Chief of the General Staff from 1935 to 1938, recommended 
the organization of a civil defence planning committee. Ashton was 
in favour of a planning committee for air raid precautions, but he 
was not prepared to keep it under the authority of the Defence 
Department. With the view that responsibility for civilian 
protection from a potential aerial attack would be too costly an
®C.P. Stacey, Arms. Men and Governments; The War Policies of 
Canada. 1939 - 1945 (Ottawa; Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 3.
?Ibid.
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undertaking, Ashton preferred that Canada adopt the British model, 
which had made civil defence a preoccupation of the Home Office.®
Follow-up on recommendations originating from the Canadian 
Defence Committee was slow to occur. The committee's ability to 
influence defence policy was incumbent upon the Prime Minister who 
was, in Donald Creighton's words, "ostentatiously aloof" from 
discussions on foreign policy and related defence themes.® In its 
role as senior advisor on defence policy, the Canadian Defence 
Committee was reduced to an occasional forum through which the 
Chiefs of Staff were given the opportunity to discuss defence 
estimates with the Ministers of Justice, Finance, and National 
Defence prior to their submission to Parliament.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King was loath to respond to the 
increasingly heightened international tensions, but Germany's 
rearmament program, coupled with the absorption of Austria by 
Germany in March of 1938, could not be ignored. People began to 
question Hitler's intentions and the legitimacy of German
®Canada, Department of National Defence, Historical Division, 
R.G. Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," 1950, p. 2; also 
available at the National Archives of Canada (NAC), Department of 
National Health and Welfare (DNH&W) , RG 29, Vol 639, File 1.00-1-10. 
Possessing an M.A. in History, Major Rannie, who served in 
artillery during the Second World War, was contracted by the 
Department of National Defence, Historical Division in 1949 to 
write a history of the Air Raid Precaution program as a back­
grounder to the Army's newly formed civil defence office. The only 
in-depth study available on ARP, this paper, among other things, 
amalgamated into one holding the federal documents of the then 
defunct ARP program.
®Donald Creighton, The Forked Road; Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto; 
McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 3.
i°Stacey, Arms. Men and Governments, p. 69.
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grievances, while politicians and bureaucrats grew increasingly 
more convinced that another European war was impending. British 
historian A.P. Taylor suggests that Hitler's use of the German army 
to assure himself of Austria's smooth transition from independence 
to incorporation had an unfavourable influence on foreign public 
opinion. As Taylor pointed out, "Hitler ceased to be an idealistic 
liberator of his fellow nationals; he appeared instead as an 
unscrupulous conqueror, bent on war and d o m i n a t i o n . S o o n  a 
stunned world began to witness the rapid rise of German 
nationalism. Mackenzie King could not ignore the failures in 
European diplomacy and in March of 1938 the Canadian Defence 
Committee established six inter-departmental committees, including 
one on Air Raid Precautions (ARP) , to plan for the defence of 
Canada in the event of a war.^^ Each of the committee reports made 
substantial contributions to the War Book,^® but King was adamant 
that the general public was to have no inkling of the preparations 
being made for their security.i* King desperately wanted to avoid 
the sensitive issue of a general mobilization which had become, in 
the public mind, associated with matters of Imperial obligations 
and conscription. The government's war preparations were lax and
l^A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War. 2nd ed. 
(Greenwich; Fawcett Publications, 1961), p. 165.
i^in addition to the ARP committee, home defence was to be 
studied by Committees on Defence Co-ordination, Censorship, 
Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property, Treatment of Ships and 
Aircraft, and Emergency Legislation.
i^Stacey, Arms. Men and Governments, p. 69.
l*Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," p. 4.
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muted in order to avoid unpleasant charges of provocation and a re­
ignition of the unity debate that had so sorely tested Prime 
Minister Robert Borden during the First World War.
Creation of the Inter-departmental Committee on Air Raid 
Precautions by Privy Council Order 531 marks the administrative 
beginning of civil defence activities in Canada. The committee's 
task was "to draw up a comprehensive scheme detailing the non­
military measures" which could be taken to protect the civilian 
population from air r a i d s . A s h t o n ' s  previous resistance to a 
military obligation for the program resulted in supervisory 
authority being assigned to the Department of Pensions and National 
Health. Although no justification was given for the decision, Major 
R.J. Rannie suggests that it was because medical assistance to 
civilians was expected to be of a high p r i o r i t y . H e  also noted 
that the Department of Pensions and National Health had close 
working relationships with the various provinces in addition to its 
familiarity with public health issues. The ARP Committee was 
chaired by the Deputy Minister of Pensions and National Health, Dr. 
R.E. Wodehouse, with representation from the Departments of 
Finance, External Affairs, Transport, Labour, Trade and Commerce, 
National Defence, the Secretary of State and the Postmaster 
General.17 In spite of such well-rounded representation, the
i®Privy Council Order 531, March 14, 1938.
i®Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," p. 5.
i^canada. Department of Pensions and National Health, Annual 
Report for March 31. 1940 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1940) p. 151.
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actual report was written through an exchange of memoranda between 
Dr. Wodehouse and Colonel M.A. Pope, Secretary of the Chiefs of 
Staff. Remaining committee members "gave constant approval and 
encouragement, and wisely did nothing."!® The report identified 
several non-military measures that would protect citizens from air 
or gas attacks including; a warning system, lighting restrictions, 
protection from incendiary and gas bombs, treatment of casualties, 
rescue parties, maintenance of utilities, dispersal of population 
and instructions for the public. It recommended, among other 
things, that Cabinet avoid a "wait and see" attitude and 
immediately begin ARP preparations. Cabinet approved the report. In 
July of 1938 a ten member Executive Committee of the Department of 
Pensions and National Health was officially made responsible for 
air raid precaution measures and a primer on the subject, modified 
from the 1934 British publication. Handbook of Passive Air Defence, 
was printed and stored for future distribution should the need 
arise. 1®
Other than writing a manual, there was little else that could 
be done given the requirement of secrecy. The Chiefs of Staff, 
having been relieved of their responsibility for public, safety, 
lost interest in air raid precautions and turned their attention to 
the military defence of Canada. ARP preparations remained dormant 
until August of 1939 when the Prime Minister learned of a Soviet-
i®Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," p. 7.
!®Ibid.. p. 6; also see the Department of Pensions and 
National Health, Annual Report for 1940, p. 152.
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German treaty of non-aggression and friendship. Aware of Britain's 
commitment to come to the aid of Poland should it be invaded, King 
assumed the worst and began to prepare for war.
The First Wave of Public Interest in civil Defence
On August 24, 1939, Dr. Wodehouse was instructed to inform the 
Premiers of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, British Columbia, and 
Quebec of ARP measures. On the following day the Premiers of Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, and British Columbia each met with a member 
of the ARP Executive Committee and Quebec was approached one week 
later. All four provinces agreed to co-operate with the federal 
government and establish local ARP committees in municipalities 
considered by the military to be "definite risk areas" including 
Sydney, Cape Breton, Halifax, Dartmouth, Saint John, Quebec City, 
Montreal, Vancouver, Victoria, Nanaimo, and Prince Rupert. On 
August 31, Cabinet granted $150,000 to the Department of Pensions 
and National Health to assist in the implementation of ARP measures 
and on September 10, when Canada declared war on Germany, 
provincial ARP committees began their call for volunteers. Almost 
instantaneously, the safety of an estimated 2.5 million people had 
become the responsibility of an Executive Committee whose 
officials, restricted by secrecy, had been capable of doing little 
more than "copy on paper the outlines of the ARP scheme that had 
been prepared in the United Kingdom.
20Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," p. 19.
[
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There were very few guidelines to regulate the decisions of 
the Executive Committee whose duties were never fully stipulated. 
Overall, policy appears to have been to pass on to provincial 
organizations the responsibility for implementing ARP, or "as much 
of the program as each province would accept."^! Influenced by 
Britain's civil defence organization, Canada followed a 
decentralized system for ARP's organizational structure but missed 
an essential point of the English system which made regional 
controllers responsible to central direction. In Canada, the 
Executive Committee was delegating responsibilities to provincial 
authorities over which it had little jurisdictional control. From 
the start, each province was given responsibility for implementing 
its own ARP program which created a very weak system for program 
standardization and co-ordination.
Lack of consultation with provincial authorities also produced 
endless confusion over funding arrangements. The Federal government 
was willing to cover the expenses of first aid training, 
instructional literature, and anti-gas equipment, but provincial 
governments were warned not to expect financial assistance for 
implementing a civil defence program. It was not long before the 
provinces were asking why they should be charged with the financial 
responsibilities of protective measures for federally designated 
cities. The lack of a financial policy was also the source of much 
criticism by provincial authorities who found themselves left to
21nAC, DNH&W, RG 29, Vol 639, File 100-1-10, "Civil Defence In 
Canada 1936 to 1946, (Synopsis)," 22 January 1953, p. 12.
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finance and equip ARP programs in low-risk towns that wanted to
implement civil defence measures. The issue of financial
responsibility became most illuminated in the "hysteria" that
followed the collapse of France in 1940:
Scores of local officials and private organizations 
throughout the country clamoured for aid and direction in 
organizing passive defence measures. They bombarded the 
government with criticism, pleas and suggestions.22
Eventually, in February of 1942, the Federal government agreed to
pay fifty per cent of ARP expenditures, and in June of 1942 a per
capita provincial grant formula was agreed upon.
In addition to poorly defined administrative duties and weak
funding arrangements, shortage of ARP supplies and equipment
resulted in provincial accusations of favouritism directed at the
federal government. One contentious issue was not being able to
charge the Federal treasury for routine, operational expenses of
the federally created program. It was federal policy that such
expenses as clerical help, utilities, telephone charges, office
rent, janitorial wages, and many other items, should be assumed
under each municipality's general operating budget. As one former
Federal ARP officer remarked, "We had no money, we had no policy
except to avoid antagonizing anybody and, above all, avoid
commitments."2®
Popular interest in ARP measures arose in response to the 
capitulation of France. Municipalities were quick to jump into
z^Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," p. 19. 
f p. 44.
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civil defence activities so long as the perception of an enemy 
attack on Canadian soil was sufficiently strong. When the perceived 
threat receded, municipalities found themselves the sponsor of 
preparedness exercises whose value could not be shown.
The Second Weve of Public Interest in Civil Defence
A rekindling of concern in ARP measures inspired many to join 
local committees following the opening of the Pacific theater of 
war. Until Japan's attack at Pearl Harbour, Hitler had been 
cautious about challenging the territorial sovereignty of the North 
American coast. With the United States' entry into the war, 
however, warfare acquired a more intimate reality for some 
Canadians. German submarines began to appear on the St. Lawrence 
River, while sporadic sightings of Japanese submarines occurred on 
the West Coast. In 1942, a total of twenty-three ships on the St. 
Lawrence Gulf and River had been hit by German torpedoes, resulting 
in twenty-two of the ships sinking; and on the West Coast, a 
Japanese submarine fired shells at Estevan Point on Vancouver 
I s l a n d . A c t i n g  on the sense of urgency that accompanied the 
development of the Pacific War, the Department of National Defence 
advised of new and vastly expanded definite risk areas. National 
security prevented the publication of the accepted municipalities 
and instead, a shaded map was used. All municipalities lying within 
darkly shaded areas were considered in definite risk while those 
located in lightly shaded areas were thought to be of a lesser risk
^"^Stacey, Arms. Men and Governments, p. 132,
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and, while qualifying for ARP funding, were given secondary 
importance in provision r e q u e s t s . Almost over night the ARP 
program became responsible for the protection of 7.5 million 
people.
The threat of an enemy attack on Canadian soil created a jump 
in the number of ARP workers by fifty percent within three 
months.26 with interest rekindled, public insistence on some 
tangible evidence of government protection pressed the federal ARP 
Executive Committee to hire a full-time director to oversee the 
demands of the program.2? on January 1, 1942 Dr. R.J. Manion, a 
former Member of Parliament for the riding of Fort William and past 
leader of the Conservative Party, was appointed Director of Civil 
Air Raid Precautions. "Fighting Bob" had lost to Mackenzie King in 
the snap election of March, 1940. Upon relinquishing the leadership 
of the Conservative Party, Manion was made an associate member of 
the Chemical Warfare Interservices Board. The purpose of this Board 
was to study gas defence requirements and retaliatory measures for 
waging gas warfare. Not surprisingly, gas protection became a
26while previously a handful of cities qualified for federal 
assistance, the expanded program included the entire province of 
Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia, the coastal areas of New 
Brunswick, all communities along the banks of the St. Lawrence 
River, and the entire coast of British Columbia.
2®Canada, Department of Pensions and National Health, Annual 
Report. 31 March 1942, pp. 155-156. On December 15, 1942, the
number of ARP workers was 94,233. By March 1943 the number of 
volunteers had jumped to 153,360 participants.
27Ibid.. p. 155.
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paramount concern in ARP training.2® An order for two million gas 
masks was placed with the Dominion Rubber Company with distribution 
left to the provincial authorities. 2® The threat of an enemy gas 
attack was never taken seriously by Canadians, and only a small 
proportion of the population actually purchased a mask. Most of 
them were "never taken out of storage for assembly and were 
eventually turned over to the War Assets Corporation at the end of 
the w a r . "20 Further orders for anti-gas equipment and clothing 
were cancelled when Brigadier General Alexander Ross, Chairman of 
the Manitoba Veteran's Association, took over the ARP program upon 
the death of Dr. Manion in July of 1943. As head of Manitoba's 
Veteran's Legion, the appointment of Ross was an acknowledgement of 
the valuable volunteer services provided by the veterans of Canada.
With the growing conviction that Canada was no longer in 
danger of having bombs dropped on it, the decision was made in 1943 
to initiate a shut-down of the local ARP organizations in central 
Canada. Later, coastal ARP organizations were notified that all 
financial aid would cease at the end of the fiscal year, on March 
31, 1945, and provincial authorities were told to turn over all 
equipment to the War Assets Corporation. In spite of the
2®Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," pp. 47-9.
2®0n the east coast, gas masks were being sold for $1.25 from 
various retail outlets as it had been thought that greater care 
would be given to the masks if they had to be purchased. However, 
criticism of the policy eventually reached the House of Commons 
where it was suggested that respirators should be made available 
free of charge in areas designated vulnerable to attack. Canada, 
House of Commons, Debates. Vol 5, 1943, p. 4832.
30Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," p. 49.
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administrative weaknesses and limited public support, approximately 
775 communities had been organized and had received ARP equipment. 
Smaller towns and villages benefited from training in fire fighting 
and many auxiliary fire fighting services became volunteer brigades 
at the end of the war. In addition to fire safety, communities 
benefited from the development of emergency medical response 
programs and first aid instruction.
Observations on the Air Raid Precaution Programme
The initial blanket of secrecy surrounding ARP preparations 
undermined the administrative effectiveness of the program. 
Wodehouse had "repeatedly" requested permission to conduct 
community needs assessments and each time he was refused by the 
Canadian Defence Committee. Unable to determine what was lacking, 
purchase orders were not placed prior to the declaration of war and 
by then, industries were busy with military requests. ARP orders 
were given a very low priority. Much confusion could have been 
avoided had the federal government released a public statement on 
the ARP guidelines at the outset of the program and had clear 
funding guidelines been made available. The omissions created 
needless confusion for participants and strong criticism from low- 
risk municipalities who were being refused federal aid. By late 
1940, complaints that ARP was not doing enough to protect the 
public gained prominence in press coverage and it became 
increasingly difficult to maintain enthusiasm for the program, even 
among the volunteer personnel. Eventually, under Dr. Manion,
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funding guidelines were developed for supply purchases and for 
their distribution. The introduction of a consistent policy reduced 
much of the early condemnation although it did not improve the flow 
of desired supplies. Nor did the distribution of gas masks help to 
deflect public criticism of the program. Manion had also been 
critical of the lack of interest and representation by the 
military. He managed to get an agreement with the Department of 
National Defence for military representation at staff meetings but 
Ross cancelled the arrangement.
The inability to meet the equipment needs of local ARP 
organizations was an ongoing problem and the chronic lack of 
supplies accounted for much of the poor state of ARP preparedness. 
ARP locals waited for such items as fire pumps, hoses, sirens, 
respirators, protective clothing and surgical supplies, in addition 
to basic personal equipment such as steel helmets, rubber boots and 
overalls. In the city of Vancouver, for instance, it was estimated 
that an efficient ARP program would require 20,000 participants, 
yet the city could provide its volunteers with only 75 pairs of 
rubber boots and 1,500 steel helmets.21 By March 1942, $721,000 
of equipment had been distributed among the target cities, but on 
order was $1.3 million of unfilled requests.2% it was becoming 
increasingly difficult for municipalities to facilitate home 
preparedness measures.
2ip.w. Luce, "British Columbia ARP Farce," Saturday Nioht. 31 
January 1942, p. 14.
22oepartment of Pensions and National Health, Annual Report. 
1942, p. 156.
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As the war in Europe dragged on, municipalities experienced 
greater difficulties in obtaining emergency equipment. Engines for 
fire truck pumpers had to be imported from the United States and 
could no longer be secured, nor was it possible to get sirens 
driven by electric motors. Communities were urged to improvise 
their air raid alarms (which could not always be heard in homes and 
businesses) . Popular siren inventions included the "artillery bomb" 
made by converting an old washing machine motor to run with an 
attached bell; other contraptions called for the re-gearing of 
small motors to activate a horn. Sound making alternatives included 
wind blown foghorns, hand-held whistles, factory whistles, steam 
whistles, fireworks, church bells, car horns, and just plain old 
shouting. Eventually, communities across Canada came to regard this 
lack of emergency preparedness as an affront by the federal 
government. If the poor state of ARP preparations was not a serious 
concern of the federal government or, for that matter, the 
military, then clearly, people believed, no real danger existed. 
Increasingly ARP was regarded as a "war farce" rather than a war 
service.
The one-way relationship between civil defence officials and 
military authorities helped to foster a public attitude of mockery 
toward air raid precautions. The Department of National Defence 
regarded the ARP program as a non-military operation, but in fact 
ARP had always been dependent on the advice of the military which 
kept the program focussed on responding to military threats. Part 
of the difficulty in maintaining public interest in civil defence
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measures was the organization's dependence on a sense of urgency. 
As Rannie pointed out, the designation of a "definite" risk area, 
did not coincide with the "attitude" of the military from 1938 
onward.22 if there was a grave danger to society, then surely the 
organization of air raid precautions would have experienced closer 
integration with the military and a higher priority for accessing 
equipment. Since Canada's civil defence measures were never tested 
under actual assault conditions, it is impossible to know if there 
was adequate protection to safeguard the civilian population. There 
is, however, little evidence to indicate that National Defence 
regarded civil defence as a legitimate "fourth arm;" nor is there 
any indication that a concerted effort was undertaken by any branch 
of the military to integrate passive with active defence measures. 
Quite the opposite occurred when it came to the issue of defending 
the homeland, as ARP and militia organizations competed against 
each other for membership.
There was a firm expectation in the Federal government that 
the bulk of the work would be undertaken by private citizens on a 
voluntary basis. As it turned out, the volunteers who were 
1 attracted to civil defence were the patriotic, the seriously- 
i minded, and the veterans of the last war.2* participation in air 
I raid precautions offered an opportunity for those who either wanted 
I to express their sense of civic duty while ensuring their own
I
personal safety, or were rejected from active service yet still
22Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," p. 18. 
2*House of Commons, Debates Vol.5, 1943, p. 4832.
?L
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wanted to make a contribution to the war effort.2® To qualify as
a civil defence worker in Canada, participants had to take a basic
course consisting of nine lectures.2® Upon completion,
participants were given an arm band, I.D. card and the title of
Sector Warden. The second phase of training consisted of choosing
a municipal service in which to specialize, while in the third
phase workers responded to a worst case scenario, co-ordinating two
or more services under blackout conditions. The quality of training
varied greatly. The St. John's Ambulance had taken over first aid
training and provided a fairly comprehensive course in emergency
assistance; however, one reviewer of Canada's ARP program bluntly
stated that warden training was deficient;
It is doubtful if more than a small minority of the ARP 
workers who were enrolled in other categories [other than 
first aid] ... really understood their job or could have 
dealt adequately with the effects of even a small scale 
air attack.27
As the war progressed, recruiters for the ARP organization 
found themselves in competition with those recruiting for the army 
reserve, and the reserve army or militia offered greater prestige. 
The militia, with its new uniforms and buildings, had grown in
^^The nine lectures comprising the Basic Course in civil 
defence were: 1. General Organization and Control of Civilian
Defence; 2. Incendiary Bombs; 3. High Explosive Bombs; 4. War 
Gases; 5. Personal Protection Against Gas; 6. Protection Against 
Gas; 7. Elements of First Aid; 8. Transportation Services and; 9. 
Public Utilities Services. C.J. Eustace, ed., Defence Training, an 
Elementary Manual for Defence Training in Secondarv Schools, p. 99.
27nac. DNH&W, "Civil Defence In Canada 1936 to 1946, 
(Synopsis)," p. 12.
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public esteem and in its sense of purpose as the war was brought 
closer to North America. Although Canada's security was still 
vulnerable to the possibility of an air attack, the real threat was 
from the submarine. Men left civil defence organizations for 
reserve forces because the reserve army "more closely approximated 
actual war activities."2® As more men moved out of the ARP and 
into the militia, it became increasingly difficult to keep the 
organization functioning at the municipal level. In British 
Columbia, the loss of personnel had become so acute that the 
Adjutant General was instructed by the Minister of National Defence 
not to recruit ARP members for the reserves without the prior 
approval of the ARP Provincial C o m m i t t e e . 29 There was talk of 
making ARP service compulsory for those men not yet enlisted in the 
reserve forces, but the suggestion was tempered by the idea that 
"foreigners" or "non-British" persons would then be participating 
in the ARP p r o g r a m . T h i s  colonial perspective was a reflection 
of the large veteran constituency. Nor was the federal government 
willing to pursue the idea of compulsory ARP service; from a 
bureaucratic perspective the nationalizing of auxiliary fire and 
police services would interfere with provincial jurisdictions, but 
mainly, compulsory service contravened the spirit of the ARP
2®House of Commons, Debates Vol. 5, 1943, p. 4832.
2®Rannie, "Civil Defence in Canada, 1936-1946," p. 51.
"Military Discipline Idea For Members of A.R.P. Advanced at 
Meeting," Globe and Mail. 30 January 1943, p. 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
program with its intent to be purely voluntary and to engage moral 
obligations.
For the general public, ARP measures were often an annoyance 
tolerated out of a sense of civic duty, and there were times when 
the ARP participants appeared to be over-stepping their authority. 
In Verdun, Quebec, for example, the civil protection committee took 
it upon itself one Saturday afternoon in March of 1941, to stop 
cars and demand registration certificates and licenses from 
drivers.*! The most invasive of ARP activities were the black-out 
exercises, undertaken periodically between 1941 and 1944. During 
these simulations, wardens would walk the neighborhoods peeking 
through key holes and shining flashlights through kitchen windows, 
trying to catch a cheating household. Smoking was not allowed 
outside and traffic would crawl to a virtual standstill except for 
the daring few who would race the blackened streets unrestrained by 
traffic lights. With a fifteen-miles-per-hour speed limit, 
blackouts were busy times for the p o l i c e . Eventually, as the 
tides of war turned in favour of the Allied Forces and the threat 
of an enemy attack on Canada receded, public complaints about the 
behaviour of wardens and the length of the blackouts became more 
frequent. With no enemy assaults on Canadian soil, diminished 
public esteem of the organization and a lack of participation by 
the general population became one of the ARP program's most salient 
features.
*!canada. House of Commons, Debates. Vol 3, 1941, p. 2719.
*2canada. House of Commons, Debates. Vol 5, 1943, p. 4822.
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In Canada during the Second World War, the importance of civil 
defence waxed and waned according to the public's perception of the 
seriousness of the enemy's threat to personal safety. The first 
peak occurred in 1940 in reaction to Germany's lightning occupation 
of the Low Countries, the British army's dramatic escape from 
Dunkirk, and the capitulation of France. The second wave of public 
interest occurred with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour in 
December of 1941. In both instances interest was fleeting and 
throughout the war the program suffered from a lack of public 
credibility. As Canada's first director of air raid precautions 
sardonically noted, "A few bombs might have changed Canada's 
mentality of civil defence c o m m i t t e e s . " *2
Civil defence measures during the Second World War did not 
acquire a consistent level of respect among Canadians. One of the 
greatest drawbacks was limited access to equipment: epidemic
throughout the country, it stretched the patience of many a 
volunteer while the distribution of gas masks grew increasingly 
farcical as the perception of a possible attack on Canadian soil 
diminished. As people followed the news of Germany's retreat under 
the combined offensive of the Soviet Union and Allied Forces, the 
perceived threat of an air raid on Canada diminished. Heightened 
confidence in the defeat of Germany began as early 1943 when the 
King government downsized the ARP program to its 1940 boundaries: 
there was no need to protect central Canada from northern attack
*2"Military Discipline Idea For Members of A.R.P. Advanced at 
Meeting," p. 4.
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routes now that the Red Army had momentum. The only remaining 
danger was to the coastal regions.** The ARP program was 
officially closed down in March of 1945, five months prior to the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
Civil defence remained dormant until the perceived threat of 
a nuclear attack on North America was acknowledged with the Soviet 
detonation of an atomic device in August of 1949. Civil defence 
measures were re-introduced into the public domain as protection 
against the effects of the atomic bomb. Had the voices of the 
atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with the real 
consequences of the atomic bomb, not been censored it would have 
been extremely difficult for people to accept civil defence 
preparedness as protection against the effects of the atomic bomb. 
Suppressing the real consequences of the atomic bomb, a new 
international world order, and associating communism with the 
threat to world peace were the three criteria needed to restore 
civil defence.
**Because of their close integration with neighbouring cities 
in the United States, border towns such as Windsor, Sarnia and 
Sault Sainte Marie also kept active civil defence organizations 
until 1945.
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CHAPTER TWO
Post world war II %##*#»; Laving The Ground For Civil_D#f
From 1945 to 1949 there was little perceived need for a civil 
defence program in Canada because the wartime atomic alliance of 
Canada, Britain, and the United States held a monopoly on atomic 
power. *2 So long as the alliance held the advantage in nuclear 
technology the Canadian public could rest assured, knowing that 
possession of the atomic bomb automatically implied control of the 
battle's outcome; threatening the aggressor with an atomic attack 
was considered a legitimate strategy so long as there was no threat 
of a counter-attack. When the Soviet Union detonated its first 
atomic device in August of 1949, the belief in nuclear superiority 
was shaken. Russia's possession of the "atomic secret" had a 
sobering effect upon the general population, and civil defence was 
re-introduced into the public domain.
By promoting the illusion of protection, the civil defence 
program encouraged public acceptance of the concept of nuclear 
deterrence and its assurances that peace could be achieved through 
the will to risk a nuclear war. Educating by persuasion, civil 
defence was a government-sponsored propaganda campaign, one in 
which information management on the effects of an atomic bomb was 
of paramount importance to the program's success.
^^Information on civil defence during the interim years can be 
found in Steven Hugh Lee, "Power, Politics and the Cold War: The 
Canadian Civil Defence Program and the North Atlantic Alliance, 
1945-1959," M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1987, pp. 26-50. This 
thesis traces the administrative history of Canada's civil defence 
program at the federal level and contends that civil defence helped 
to consolidate Canada's "junior partnership" in the defence 
alliance with Britain and the United States.
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Without the initial censorship on the effects of atomic bombs, 
especially radioactive fallout, the government claim that civil 
defence measures provide protection against an atomic bomb attack 
would not have been so readily accepted by the civilian population. 
Suppression of atomic horrors was designed to evoke specific public 
reactions to the atomic bomb which legitimized the political power 
of nuclear weapon adherents, a defence policy based on nuclear 
deterrence, and civil defence measures. This is what the winner of 
the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for Literature, Kenzaburo Oe suggested 
when he said: "Hiroshima and Nagasaki had become known throughout 
the world because the power of the atomic bomb had been 
demonstrated there, not because of the suffering of the A-bomb 
victims.
Atomic bombs were esteemed for their power to destroy 
instantly while the magnitude of human misery, suffering, and death 
that is part of the weapon's effects were deliberately ignored. The 
unrestrained willingness of Canadians to adopt civil defence 
measures confirms a general state of public ignorance about the 
human misery an atomic bomb causes and affirms the unqualified 
success of a carefully controlled media campaign. It was not until 
the consequences of the 1954 hydrogen bomb test, code named BRAVO, 
became known that Canadians began to realize that they had been 
misinformed about the dangers of radiation and radioactive fallout.
*®Kenzaburo Oe, Hiroshima Notes, trans. D. Swain and Toshi 
Yonezawa (Tokyo: YMCA Press, 1965; reprint ed., New York: Grove 
Press, 1996), p. 68.
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Initial Caaaorship of tha Atomic Bomb in Canada
The final directive sent from the military officer in charge 
of building the atomic bomb, General Leslie R. Groves, to General 
Spaatz, Field Commander of the sortie dropping the atomic bomb, 
stated:
Dissemination of any and all information concerning the 
use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the 
Secretary of War and the President of the United States.
No communiqués on the subject or releases of information 
will be issued by Commanders in the field without 
specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent 
to the War Department for special clearance.
By policy announced on July 23, 1945, all foreign dispatches on the
atomic bomb were subject to clearance by the United States War
Department's Information Office in Washington, D.C. The policy
restricted the transmission of information about Hiroshima to one
radio channel. Thus, the War Department's Information Office had
sole jurisdiction on determining the kind of information being
released to the Press because it alone decided how much information
would be available and the phrases around which news stories could
be printed. From the outset, Canadian newspapers were dependent
upon American foreign press services for their information on the
atomic bombings. Under the rubric of national security, everything
North Americans learned through the media about the bombings had
*7Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told; The Storv of the 
Manhattan Project (New York; Harper 6 Brothers, 1962), pp. 308, 
346-48; also see Rachelle Linner, Citv of Silence: Listening to 
Hiroshima (New York: Orbis Books, 1995), p. 16.
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been censored and as such, prepared by the United States War 
Department.*®
Initial press reports about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
saturated people with images of the bomb's enormous destructive 
power. The banner headline for the Fort William Daily Times Journal 
for August 7, 1945 read "Atomic Bomb of Terrifying Power Blasts Jap 
Base." Headlines for the articles about the atomic bombing 
confirmed that a monumental event had occurred. Phrases such as: 
"Huge Damage," "Stunned Nips," "New Ultimatum" and a "Big Role 
Played by Canada" reinforced the powerful impact caused by the 
atomic bomb and Canada's participation in building a 
technologically superior weapon. Only "enemy propagandists" 
protested the bomb's use under the heading "Japs Scream Atomic Bomb 
Is Inhuman," but even here the focus was on the catastrophic power 
of the bomb. Through these initial articles, the citizens of 
Northwestern Ontario, like those across the country, would learn 
about the destructive power of the atomic bomb.
Through media releases, the destructive force of an atomic 
bomb was identified with blast and fire and subsequent claims of 
atomic bomb victims dying from radiation sickness were vehemently 
denied. Eventually, the United States would recognize death from 
exposure to gamma radiation emitted by the initial explosion of the 
atomic bomb but would not admit to death from delayed, radioactive
*®For an exhaustive study on the political, ethical, and 
psychological effects of censorship on the American public, see 
Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: Fifty 
Years of Denial (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1995).
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fallout. The campaign to deny lingering radiation saturated the 
North American news wires with various articles. On September 12, 
the Dailv Times Journal published an Associated Press clipping out 
of San Francisco whose headline read, "Experts Report: Atomic Toll 
Staggering" which quoted from Colonel Stafford Warren, chief 
medical officer of the Manhattan Project and head of the Hiroshima 
Investigation Team's medical component. While the destruction had 
been "much greater" than had been anticipated, Warren noted that, 
"there was no dangerous radio-activity lingering in the area."*® 
Warren did not deny that radioactivity was produced by the atomic 
bomb, but casualties were from the initial explosion rather than 
afterwards from residual radiation. The reason for such certainty? 
"The bomb was designed as a blast weapon." A second article, "No 
Trace of Radio-action at Hiroshima" appeared two days later.®® 
This article discredited rumours of relief workers falling ill 
after assisting in the evacuation of the wounded: "No measurable 
radio-activity was found under the point of detonation or elsewhere 
on the ground, streets, in ash cans or on other materials." The 
claim was given further credence by citing a Japanese "official" 
who reported that not one of the relief workers had died and, just 
in case there was some residual radiation, "none was affected 
seriously." Descriptions of the extent of damage caused by the 
bomb's blast occupied most of the article's space.
*®"Experts Report: Atomic Toll Staggering," Dailv Times
Journal. 12 September 1945, p. 13.
®°"No Trace of Radio-action At Hiroshima," Dailv Times 
Journal. 14 September 1945, p. 5.
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The pronouncement of no residual radiation or radioactive 
fallout ended the public relations campaign from Japan as the flow 
of information from Hiroshima virtually ceased after the denial of 
radiation dangers. On September 19, a press code was adopted that 
imposed Occupation approval for Japanese radio broadcasts, news 
articles, magazines stories, and other print media. As a result, 
publications of reports, commentaries, and treatises dealing with 
atomic bomb damages were forbidden. The Press Code ended on October 
31, 1949, although the Allied Occupation enforced silence on A-bomb 
matters until 1951. Scholarly research picked up quickly after the 
occupation ended, but public discussion remained sparse until the 
1954 hydrogen bomb test, BRAVO, sparked new interest in radioactive 
fallout.
The practice of pre-censorship had obscured the human cost by 
distracting public attention with questions of political control, 
with scientific explanations of how an atomic bomb worked, with 
justifications for its use and fantasies about its future 
applications.®! significantly, the first graphic descriptions of 
human suffering were countered by reminders of Pearl Harbour and of 
bringing the war to a quick conclusion. Any compassion toward the 
suffering of the A-bomb victims was countered by descriptively
®!one future scenario depicted the heating of the Great Lakes 
by detonating an atomic bomb over Lake Superior; the warmed water 
would keep shipping lanes open year round while creating a new 
"summer paradise" out of the frozen north capable of rivalling the 
Mediterranean vacation. This grotesque fantasy was one of hundreds 
and testified to people's ignorance about the nature of the atomic 
bomb. "Heating of Great Lakes by Atomic Power Held Possible," Daily 
Times Journal. 11 August 1945, p. 1.
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lurid accounts of Japanese treatment towards prisoners of war. From 
these first crucial moments of the atomic age, references to the 
human experience were markedly limited and always presented in 
competition with other issues surrounding atomic e n e r g y . ®2
Monica Braw wrote a path-breeücing dissertation for the 
University of Ulam, Sweden, on the Occupation's Press Code. 
Accepted for publication, in the book she said that censorship had 
"distorted the post-war global nuclear debate by stilling the 
voices of atomic victims and by concealing basic information on the 
consequences of atomic warfare."®® Steadfast denial of residual 
radiation and burial of the human suffering caused by the atomic 
bombings thwarted public discussion on the wisdom of pursuing a 
defence policy based on nuclear deterrence. Concealment of the 
human effects of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki lie 
at the heart of civil defence measures and offers one such example 
of how the nuclear debate was distorted for the general public.
The need for civil defence in the postwar period was 
reinforced by the Soviet Union and the United States military 
establishments' desire to acquire, maintain and expand their 
nuclear arsenals. In order to sustain a program of nuclear weapons 
modernization, the military needed political and public support.
®2por information on the United States' domestic censorship 
practices toward atomic energy, see Patrick S. Washburn, "The 
Office of Censorship's Attempt to Control Press Coverage of the 
Atomic Bomb During World War II," Journalism Monographs 120 
(September 1989): 1-43.
®®Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship 
in Occupied Japan (New York: East Gate Book, 1991), p. 16.
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Political support was gained by restructuring international 
relations into two monolithic blocs. Public support was gained by 
suppressing the real nature of the atomic bomb and on the basis of 
a threat to national security.
A New System of International Order
In the aftermath of World War Two neither Russia nor the 
United States wanted war, but both were afraid of peace. In many 
ways, the Cold War was an "extension" of the Second World War - a 
new "system of international order" brought about as a direct
result of their failure to settle the terms of peace.®* Sustained
by intense antagonism and hostility, neither superpower could 
ignore the perpetual threat of a nuclear end. Security became the 
substitute for peace. Canada endeavoured to achieve national
security by two means: through the United Nations, particularly 
through the International Atomic Energy Commission (lAEC); and 
through military alliances, most notably the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the North American Air Defence treaty 
(NORAD) . As it became clearer that the lAEC would not be able to 
develop an effective system of control for atomic weapons,
Canadians turned to participation in continental and multilateral 
security alliances. These regional military alliances helped create
®*Reg Whitaker, "From World War to Cold War, " Uncertain 
Horizons: Canadians and Their World in 1945. Canadian Committee for 
the History of the Second World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 
1997), p. 308.
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a society that, in Richard Falk's words, was living in a "permanent 
pre-war posture" that makes "wartime" the "institutional norm."®®
In the autumn of 1945, Canada renounced any intention of 
building atomic bombs but, as noted by John W. Warnock, the 
government never renounced the use of atomic weapons, only their 
production.®® This policy would influence Canada's actions on the 
United Nations' International Atomic Energy Commission. General 
A.G.L. McNaughton, Canada's first representative on the Atomic 
Energy Commission and Committee Chairman for the period of August 
14 to September 14, 1946, worked hard to obtain a consensus between 
American representative, Bernard Baurch, and Soviet representative, 
Andrei Gromyko, on international control of atomic weapons. While 
McNaughton may have been sincere in his desire to reach an 
agreement, the Prime Minister's instructions were to forfeit a 
system of international controls over atomic energy if it required 
splintering the atomic alliance.®? in short, McNaughton could seek 
to modify the Baurch Plan (the United States' proposal for 
international control of atomic energy) but could not advocate an 
alternate scheme.
When it came time for the Commission to vote on acceptance of 
the Baurch Plan, Canada voted with the United States and helped to 
ensure a stalemate which persisted for much of the following year.
®®Lifton and Falk, Indefensible Weapons, pp. 140-41.
®®John W. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth; The Military Policy of 
a Satellite Canada (Chicago: New Press, 1970), p. 95.
57James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada:__ Pgaç^paklng__âOd
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 284.
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In November 1947, then Under Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Lester B. Pearson, informed Canada's Advisory Panel on 
Atomic Energy that it was because of the intransigence of the 
Soviet Union that international control of atomic energy could not 
be achieved. General McNaughton remained silent on this issue, but 
years later, in 1965, he told an interviewer that the Baurch Plan 
was "insincerity from beginning to end."®® According to Gordon 
Edward, founder of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear 
Responsibility, there was a perceived need in Canada to maintain 
close ties with the American nuclear program since Canada's nuclear 
industry was dependent upon American support; Canada could not 
afford to expand its nuclear industry without plutonium sales to 
the United States.®® Canada's acceptance of and participation in 
nuclear weapons proliferation helped create a governing consensus 
that differed little from the American views of nuclear strategy.
Attempts at creating collective defence arrangements through 
the United Nations were failing. The veto system of the Security 
Council effectively nullified its ability to act in situations of 
international crisis; and as much as Canadians yearned for "One 
World," security was not going to be found through the United 
Nations. The successive takeover of East European states by 
Communist parties, culminated in the communist coup of
®®Ibid.. p. 295.
®®Edward Gordon, "Canada's Nuclear Industry ahd the Myth of 
the Peaceful Atom," in Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race, eds. Ernie 
Regehr and Simon Rosenblum (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1978), p. 
124.
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Czechoslovakia in February of 1948. This event, taken together with 
the Soviet blockade of Berlin later that same year and the 
accumulation of Soviet land forces on their western border, 
prompted the creation of the North Atlantic alliance in 1949. The 
alliance offered the security guarantees that the UN was unable to 
provide. It restored political and psychological confidence, and a 
balance of power to Western Europe; the threat of a Soviet invasion 
was countered by the threat of nuclear retaliation from the United 
States. In Canada, the alliance was seen as a "necessity for 
stability" and substituted for the failure of the United Nations to 
provide for collective security.®® At the same time, this 
multilateral alliance lessened Canadian fears of a "North American 
bunker" mentality developing in the United States, which threatened 
to undermine Canadian sovereignty. As one Canadian diplomat noted, 
"you were less likely to get raped if there were fifteen in the 
bed."®!
The American monopoly on nuclear weapons was broken four 
months after the signing of the North Atlantic treaty, and that 
same year the communists under Mao Tse-tung won control of mainland 
China. In 1950, the invasion of South Korea by the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea appeared as further proof that the 
Soviet Union was intent on expanding its sphere of influence. The 
full-scale conflict of the Korean War consolidated world power into
®®Tom Keating and Larry Pratt, Canada. NATO and the Bomb; The 
Western Alliance in Crisis (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1988), p. 
19.
®!lbid.. p. 22.
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two blocs. The Western bloc understood the bipolarity as a policy 
of "containing" the expansionism of the Soviet Union, mainly by 
strategically placed military bases, a sort of cordon sanitaire. To 
the Russians, this appeared as "encirclement" and came to form one 
of the main themes of the Soviet Union's propaganda against 
"imperialism" in the Cold War; between the two superpowers, fears 
were reciprocal. Regardless of the system of government, wrote 
political scientist John H. Herz, "both blocs have in common the 
essential tendency to form one vast impermeable unit of 
territoriality under the leadership (or control) of one predominant 
state within the bloc."®® In its search for security, Canada had 
joined the collective security of the Western bloc.
Breaking from the study of Canada's position in interbloc 
history, British historian Mary Kaldor proposed an "imaginary war 
concept" which presupposes fear of an external enemy to address 
conflicts within the blocs.®® Imaginary war was predicated on 
maintaining internal cohesion within the bloc and on military 
preparedness. Kaldor questioned whether there ever was a deep 
underlying conflict between East and West, suggesting instead that 
the two post-war social systems complemented each other: neither 
side intended to invade the other. Deterrence, instead of 
preventing war, actually contributed to keeping the idea of war and 
the idea of conflict alive.
®2john H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Aoe (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 126.
®®Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West 
Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990).
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Civil defence in Canada can also be regarded as a symptom of 
the imaginary war - in a permanent state of pretend war, civil 
defence preparations contributed to the normalization of wartime 
practices. Public interest in civil defence correlates strongly 
with brinkmanship politics, where intensified international 
hostilities were marked by an increase in war rhetoric. Against 
Soviet subversion, public support for a policy of deterrence was 
reliant on the cultivation of a belief in the possibility of 
survival - itself resting upon the presentation of civil defence 
programs. Through civil defence, Canadians could be taught to fear 
communism but not panic at the prospects of a nuclear war.
Creating the Enemy in the Public Mind
A crucial instrument in the selling of nuclear security was 
the promulgation of the concept of an external enemy. British 
physicist and former naval officer, P.M.S. Blackett, was an early 
critic of security based on atomic weapons. He foresaw that large 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons would only be tolerated by people 
convinced of a truly diabolical enemy: "Once a nation bases its 
security on an absolute weapon, such as the atom bomb, it becomes 
psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy."®* In
®*Quoted in Frank Barnaby, ed., The Gala Peace Atlas: Survival 
into the Third Millennium (New York: Doubleday, 1988), pp. 45-6. In 
addition to contesting America's reasons for dropping the atomic 
bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Blackett challenged the widespread 
conviction that the Soviet Union would launch an attack on American 
cities as soon as it became technically feasible. By confronting 
this conviction he concentrated on the atomic bomb as the ultimate 
weapon of war. President Truman once remarked that Blackett's 
mistake was to analyze the atomic bomb as a weapon of war. The
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the ensuing East-West conflict and competition, the military in 
each bloc fostered and maintained the other as the "absolute enemy" 
in order to sustain a political structure accepting of and 
dependent on nuclear weapons.
It was during the later half of the 1940s that Canadians came 
to regard the Soviet Union as the enemy. The first concerted 
government effort to vilify the Soviet Union was through the 
Gouzenko Affair. On September 6, 1945, Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King learned that a cipher clerk in the Russian Embassy, Igor 
Gouzenko, had defected with documents proving that Canadian civil 
servants were beiifg used to provide Soviet intelligence with 
information. Gouzenko's defection became public knowledge five 
months later, when twelve men and two women were picked up by the 
RCMP and detained incommunicado.
Soviet espionage came as a startling surprise both inside and 
outside of government. Even before Gouzenko's revelation became 
public knowledge, top-level ministerial inquiries within the atomic 
alliance had ended any concerns that nuclear physicist Alan Nunn 
May, identified by Gouzenko to be a spy, had passed vital atomic 
bomb information over to the Russians. Nonetheless, a decision was 
made by Mackenzie King, British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, and 
President Truman to link the matter of Russian espionage with the 
problem of effectively controlling the atomic bomb. Reginald
annihilating factor precluded its use but the threat of its use 
could not be ignored and was useful as a political and diplomatic 
weapon, see Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear. A History of Images 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 139.
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Whitaker and Gary Marcuse argue that the decision to emphasize 
atomic spying was made because such a scandal would "damage the 
case" for international agreement on atomic bomb control while 
strengthening the unity of the atomic alliance.
The Taschereau-Ke1lock Royal Commission to investigate 
Gouzenko's claims of Soviet espionage inside Canada revived the 
wartime fear of the saboteur. After careful review of the hearings, 
Whitaker and Marcuse have concluded that: "Nothing in the
activities of the Canadian scientists and technicians apprehended 
in the Gouzenko affair justified the inflated atom spy ring label 
that was (and has continued to be) attached to accounts of the 
affair."66 Nonetheless, the Royal Commission managed to forge a 
political environment of animosity and hostility toward the Soviet 
Union while concomitantly creating consensus that communism was the 
antithesis of democracy. In searching out communist sympathizers 
the commissioners inferred guilt by association and increased the 
authority of the RCMP to undertake a "political policing" of 
society.67 civil servants, university professors, union 
representatives, civil liberty and peace organizations and the 
media were all screened for potential fifth column infiltration. 
The threat of being associated with a leftist or communist 
organization or with persons suspected of commiserating with
6®Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making 
of a National Insecurity state. 1945-1957 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 36-42.
66Ibid.. p. 91.
6‘̂WhiteUcer, "From World War to Cold War," p. 314.
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communism truncated the political left. One method of absolving 
oneself of the label of traitor was to co-opt the official line 
that communism was a threat to the peace and security of the state. 
Proof of loyalty could be demonstrated by advocating preparedness 
measures. Such was the tactic employed by Dr. Cyril James, 
principal of McGill University, when his loyalty was called into 
question by the commissioners.6̂
The Gouzenko Affair was presented to Canadians in the terms of 
wartime activities; of espionage and counter-espionage, of Russian 
blackmail and trickery, of innocent and not so innocent Canadians. 
The tale of Russian spying was a "sordid story" and influenced 
Canadian views on Russia's place in the new international order. 
Charges of Soviet spies transmitting to Moscow "everything a spy 
would be interested in," including information on the "atomic bomb, 
radar, military weapon developments, the Muskox expedition and 
Canada's economic life," led Canadians to believe that the former 
ally was exhibiting the behaviour of an e n e m y . 69 A few days later, 
Ottawa told Canadians that a "vast and treacherous fifth column" 
was gathering information "in the event of war." This "gigantic" 
spy ring was a "protective measure" by the Russians who "feel they 
are faced with a hostile world." Having insinuated that Russia 
regarded Canada as a potential enemy, Canadians were reminded that 
in the event of another war, "Canada might be in the path of
6®whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada, p. 107.
69II Sordid Story of Betrayal is Uncovered," Dailv Times 
Journal. 18 February 1946, p. 1.
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invasion."7° In Canada, amidst the "largest public reactions" to 
the atomic bomb, arose "this feeling that the lid was now off the 
Arctic."71 Soviet espionage strengthened the feeling of 
vulnerability since the activity of spying implied an unfriendly 
purpose.
By the time that civil defence was re-introduced into society, 
belief in the malevolent intentions of communism had been well 
established in the public mind. Creating a composite image of the 
enemy as evil and therefore aggressive was essential to win public 
support for continued nuclear weapons development and testing. 
Concomitantly, public awareness of the radioactive dangers to human 
health from nuclear weapons testing were markedly absent from the 
public forum. Under the guise of national security, the public was 
encouraged to accept nuclear deterrence as the best policy for 
preventing war.
However, in order for nuclear defence to make sense, nuclear 
war must be perceived as survivable. Civil defence was the key to 
making nuclear war appear as a localized disaster, easily managed 
by well-prepared municipalities. In the context of nuclear 
deterrence, civil defence contributed to the illusion that national 
security could be obtained through the maintenance of nuclear 
weapons, even after the harmful effects of radiation became known
70"Vast and Treacherous Spy Ring is Disclosed Working for 
Russians," Dailv Times Journal. 20 February 1946, p.l.
7ijohn W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace; Canada and the Search 
for World Order. 1943 - 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1979), p. 205.
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to the public. Civil defence provided an "official" platform 
through which the seriousness of radioactive contamination could be 
minimized while sustaining fear in the potential danger of an enemy 
attack.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER THREE 
The R#-#m#ra#mo# of Civil Defence In Canada 
Planning for Survivals Post World War Two Civil Defence in Canada
Implementing a small, informational program on civil defence 
was recommended by the Chief of Staff, General Charles Foulkes, 
during a December 1947 meeting of the Defence Research Board. 
Foulkes was worried about the growing number of "alarmist 
statements" being made on "the effects of atomic bombs and 
bacteriological warfare in which people were being told that there 
was no defence."72 Much of the public's apprehension was caused 
by John Mersey's Hiroshima which had just been released in 
paperback and was well on its way to becoming a commercial best­
seller.73 Initially written as an article for the New Yorker. 
Hiroshima described six people's experiences following the atomic 
bomb explosion. Letting the voices of the survivors carry the 
narrative, Mersey caught the magnitude of the catastrophe and the 
abhorrence of war. Everyone who read Hiroshima was reminded that 
the atomic bomb was not used upon an "enemy," a "city," or a 
"military garrison," but upon ordinary people. By the reading of 
Hiroshima. the wartime vilification of the Japanese race was 
vanquished and replaced with a popular desire to banish nuclear 
weapons. For General Foulkes, re-introducing the subject of civil
72NAC, DNH&W, RG 24, Vol 5256, File 22.7.1(1), "Report on the I  Question of Civil Defence," Item 2.6 of the Defence Research Board, 
Meeting No. 5, December 15, 1947.
73sy 1948, Hiroshima had been through three printings. It had 
achieved fifty-six printings by 1985. John Mersey, Hiroshima (New 
York: Alfred A Knopf, 1946; Bantam Books, 1985).
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defence would act as a counter-narrative to the growing "build up 
of a defeatist attitude in the c o u n t r y . "74 Foulkes was especially 
sensitive to public anxieties about the annihilating power of the 
atomic bomb. Such fears heightened the enigma surrounding radiation 
and increased support for a ban on nuclear weapons. It also 
undermined the rhetoric of the Cold War in its attempt to align the 
meaning of peace with the concept of security through nuclear 
deterrence.
The public's desire for a future world free of nuclear weapons 
hinged on the international control of atomic weapons. Hope for 
Great Power co-operation was widespread, extending even into remote 
lumber camps of northern Ontario. The "Atom Bomb" resolution passed 
by the Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Local 2786 of Port Arthur, 
Ontario in July of 1946 called for "banning the use of atomic 
weapons" and eliminating the "secrecy surrounding atomic 
processes."75 in a logical twist, they asserted that the pre-war 
policy of appeasement was being "revived in the form of Atomic 
diplomacy." Canada, the resolution claimed, was a party to the 
appeasement. Proof of collusion were news reports of "diplomatic 
negotiations between Ottawa and Washington for a string of Atomic 
Bomb bases all across Canada's northland," and the "rapid
7%AC. DNH&W, RG 24, Vol 5256, File 22.7.1(1), "Report on the 
Question of Civil Defence," Item 2.6 of the Defence Research Board, 
Meeting No. 5, December 15, 1947.
75Thunder Bay, Lakehead University Archives, Oscar Styffe 
Collection, MG 7, Box 33, Vol 14, File I-l, "Atom Bomb," in the 
Report of the Eleventh Annual Convention. Lumber & Sawmill Workers' 
Local 2786, Port Arthur, Ontario, July 12, 1946, p. 3.
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integration of Canada's economic, political and military policies 
with those of the United States. "76 The Lumber and Sawmill 
Worker's Local was not opposed to the use of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes, but it was opposed to the use of atomic bombs as 
instruments of national policy, because under these conditions, 
atomic bombs threatened "the destruction of civilization."
The mounting failures of the International Atomic Energy 
Commission to formulate an agreement on the control of atomic 
energy coupled with Mersey's graphic descriptions of the human cost 
was raising public concern. Anti-war sentiment was finding public 
expression in the rise of political peace movements, such as the 
Canadian Peace Congress.7? One way to circumvent the anti-war, 
anti-nuclear sentiment was by advocating civil defence preparedness 
measures. Civil defence, being premised on the assumption that it 
was possible to survive a nuclear attack, countered popular fears 
of atomic bombs ending human civilization. Assurances that the 
public could be protected from such an attack would, in turn, help 
to rationalize increases in military expenditures.
76ibid. While suggestions of atomic bomb bases helped to 
dramatize public fears of an atomic attack, no nuclear weapons were 
acquired for Canada until after the 1963 defeat of the Diefenbaker 
government. Nonetheless, during the St. Laurent government, three 
strings of radar posts were created along different northern 
latitudes. In 1951, the Pinetree Air Warning Line was established 
in the general vicinity of the Canadian-American border. This radar 
line was followed in 1953 by the Mid-Canada Line, also known as the 
McGill Fence, built along the 55th parallel. The last radar line 
built in Canada was the 1954, Distant Early Warning System (DEW- 
line).
77cary Moffatt, A Historv of the Peace Movement in Canada. 2nd 
ed. (Ottawa: Grape Vine Press, 1982), pp. 17-20.
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There were no objections from the Defence Research Board to 
General Foulkes' recommendation, but decisive action did not occur 
until after the January 1948 meeting of the Cabinet Defence 
Committee. The Committee had been called together to discuss the 
decisions of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence meetings of 
November 20 and 21, 1947.78 one of the agenda items concerned
civil defence. General A.G.L. McNaughton, as Canada's Chairman of 
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, drew attention to the fact 
that Canadians were at a "disadvantage" when discussing civil 
defence because "the responsibility for co-ordinating civil defence 
measures, which had previously been with the Department of Pensions 
and National Health, had not been fixed for the future."7* Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King responded to McNaughton's remarks by 
stating that:
... for the time being responsibility for initial planning 
with respect to civil defence [would] be with the 
Department of National Defence, pending a decision as to 
which civilian department should take on this task 
permanently."6°
78The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was seeking greater 
defence integration between Canada and the United States through 
co-ordination of training methods, standardization of equipment, 
reciprocal access to defence facilities, joint training exercises, 
and integrated air defence systems (which eventually resulted in 
the 1957 agreement on a joint command of air defence (NORAD) ). 
Denis Smith, Diplomacy of Fear. Canada and the Cold War. 1941-1948 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 161-64.
7*Quoted in Steven Hugh Lee, "Power, Politics and the Cold 
Waur: The Canadian Civil Defence Program and the North Atlantic 
Alliance, 1945-1959," p. 49.
®°Ibid.
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From the outset, it was never intended that civil defence 
remain with the Department of National Defence, although for the 
first three years the organization's administration would be 
handled through the Army. The final impetus for re-establishing a 
civil defence program in Canada was a need to contribute to the 
collective defence of the continent, a defence ultimately founded 
on America's possession of atomic weapons. Assuring people that 
with careful planning individuals could be protected from the 
effects of an atomic bomb would help Canadians to accept a strategy 
of nuclear deterrence. The need for this strategy was reinforced by 
an increasingly bi-polar world and a growing fear of an "enemy 
within" which resulted in "a systematic red-baiting...by those in 
the highest places, " in an attempt to associate the anti- 
nuclear ists with communism.®^
In October of 1948, Major-General Frederick Frank Worthington 
was called out of retirement, at age sixty-three, and appointed 
Federal Co-ordinator of Civil Defence and Special Advisor to the 
Minister of National Defence. Born in Peterhead, Scotland, General 
Worthington had enlisted in the Black Watch during World War One, 
serving in France and Belgium. He commanded the Fourth Armoured 
Division during the Second World War and in 1946 had been appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command. When first appointed 
Civil Defence Co-ordinator and Special Advisor to the Minister of 
Defence, Worthington was expected to:
®%offatt, A Historv of the Peace Movement in Canada, p. 20.
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...keep abreast of the civil defence situation and plan 
the necessary organization with the appropriate agencies 
of the federal, provincial and municipal governments.
...At this stage he will act purely in an advisory 
capacity.®^
Worthington, however, was also an avid supporter of joint 
defence arrangements with the United States advocating "complete 
integration, complete standardization and even placing of Canadian 
forces under overall American command."®® Thus, in addition to 
setting up a Canadian civil defence organization, Worthington also 
entered into negotiations with American civil defence authorities 
to ensure that civil defence measures would be integrated into the 
basic security plan for North America. Under the Mutual Aid 
Agreement of 1951, both Canada and the United States agreed to co­
ordinate civil defence "for the protection of persons and property 
from the results of enemy attack as if there were no border."®* 
The news release noted that "complete agreement was reached on all 
points so as to ensure complete co-operation on all matters 
regarding civil defence information, research, planning, 
organization, and training."®® Coming in the second year of the 
Korean War, the announcement generated no objection from the press
®®NAC, DNH&W, RG 29, Vol 639, File 100-1-10, Memo from the 
Minster of National Defence, Brooke Claxton to The Governor General 
in Council, October 7, 1948.
®®Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada, p. 142.
®*NAC, Privy Council Office (PCO), RG 2, Series B-2, Vol 152, 
File D-IOO-C(U), "Defence of Canada - Civil Defence - Canada-US 
Cooperation," n.d.
®®Ibid.
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corps, nor were questions raised about the possibility of competing 
political authorities in a borderless North America.
According to Worthington's wife and biographer, the Department 
of National Defence never expected civil defence to become anything 
more than a "token front."®® Worthington did not agree and left 
to his own devices, he focussed on developing an organizational 
plan and gaining support for its implementation. In early 1949, he 
travelled to Europe to study the civil defence organizations 
operating in England, Scandinavia, and Germany before attending 
England's civil defence staff school. Upon his return, Worthington 
set up a cross-country promotional tour that garnered the interest 
and support of the provincial premiers, the St. John Ambulance, the 
Boy Scouts, the Red Cross Society, the Imperial Order of the 
Daughters of the Empire, the Canadian Medical Association, and the 
associations of Canadian nurses, police chiefs, pharmacists, and 
fire marshals.
One tactic used by Worthington to impress upon the premiers 
the seriousness of the need for a civil defence program was to
®®Larry Worthington, Worthy; A Bioaraohv of Maior-General F.F. 
Worthington (Toronto; Macmillan Ltd., 1961), p. 223. 'Larry' is the 
childhood nickname for Frank Worthington's wife, Clara. Given the 
relationship of the author to the subject, the book was expectedly 
anecdotal, however, it was written while Frank was still alive and 
Clara could "nag" for details. Unfortunately, there is no other 
biography to counter Clara's reactions to her husband's various 
experiences with the armed forces. There is an undeniable 
bitterness that Clara harbours toward the civil defence program, 
which she associates with a growing sense of dejection in her 
husband as his own optimism for the programme waned. Clara blames 
the loss of optimism on federal resistance to the program's 
development and ignores the possibility that the change in demeanor 
may have been caused by a realization of what a nuclear war would 
mean for civilization.
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arrange for at least one senior army officer to be in attendance at 
each meeting.®7 xn addition to legitimizing the civil defence 
program with what appeared as Army support, in Worthington's 
opinion, military representation would also "constitute official 
recognition of the need of liaison at a later date."®® Army 
Lieutenant General Guy Simonds was not impressed and disapproved 
the use of a military representative.®* In Simond's view, the
military's involvement in civil defence was only a temporary
measure until a decision was made about which civil authority would 
be responsible for the program. The task of the army was to provide 
for the defence of the country - not for the protection of the 
civilian population. Simonds' objection to military representation 
at civil defence meetings was overridden by the Minister of 
Defence, Brooke Claxton,*® and the practice continued until the
program was transferred to the Department of National Health and
Welfare in February of 1951.
Service associations were quick to champion civil defence 
measures. For some, such as the Boy Scouts and the Imperial Order 
of the Daughters of the Empire, civil defence appealed to their
®7nAC, PCO, RG 2. Series B-2, Vol 152, File D-IOO-C (1.1), 
"Civil Defence Memorandum" No. 17/50, May 1950.
®®NAC, DNH&W, RG 29, Vol 369, File 100-10-1, Letter to Brook 
Claxton from Frank Worthington, 13 March 1950.
®*NAC, PCO, RG 2, Series B-2, Vol 152, "Chiefs of Staff 
Committee Report," August 3, 1950.
*°NAC, DNH&W, RG 29, Vol 639, File 100-10-1, "Memorandum to 
Civil Defence Co-ordinator from Minister of National Defence," 
March 23, 1950.
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sense of patriotic duty and of doing good works for the community. 
For others, such as the St. John Ambulance Association, support of 
civil defence validated first-aid training. General instruction 
also improved when casualty simulations were introduced for the 
training of civil defence rescue teams. St. John Ambulance 
recognized the value of simulating injuries and incorporated the 
practice into its own first-aid training programme.
Municipal fire fighting services also benefitted from the 
introduction of civil defence. Standardization of firehose 
couplings was the first controversial issue that Worthington took 
on as a civil defence measure, with the full support of the 
Canadian Standards Association and Ontario Fire Chiefs' 
Association. It took two years for the financial details to be 
worked out with Ontario, the first province to agree to 
standardization, for a cost of $900,000 (of which two-thirds was 
covered by the federal government).*® Standardization enabled fire 
companies to provide assistance anywhere in the province and 
eventually in the country. Fire equipment standardization formed a 
crucial element in the mutual aid policy of civil defence.
*iworthington. Worthy; A Biography of Maior-General F.F. 
Worthington, p. 227.
*®Paul Deacon, "Our Civil Defense: Are the Borders Barriers?" 
Financial Post 8 September 1951, p. 7; "Standardization of Fire 
Equipment Speeded by Needs of Civil Defence," Financial Post. 15 
September 1951, p. 23.
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Worthington's cross-country publicity tour was well-timed.
These "preliminary indoctrination conversations"*® (as they were
called by Worthington) were given a heightened sense of urgency
with the successful Soviet explosion of an atomic device in August
of 1949. Now that Canadians had to contend with the very real
threat of an atomic attack, media interest in civil defence began
to increase, and it became more difficult for the Department of
Defence to keep civil defence at the planning stage. In the House
of Commons, Defence Minister Brooke Claxton was being called upon
to justify the lack of preparations and information available to
the public. Mindful of the credibility problem experienced under
the Air Raid Precaution program, Claxton argued that local civil
defence committees would not be able to maintain the continued
interest of its participants. If local civil defence committees
were set up and:
... there was nothing for them to do except carry on for 
any considerable period the kind of training that civil 
defence groups would, then the men and women who would 
devote their spare time to this activity would soon cease 
to be interested in it, and would not be on hand should 
an emergency arise. The whole job would have to be done
all over again. 94
By June of 1950, with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, 
public anxiety concerning a possible Soviet attack could no longer 
be satisfied by the federal government plan and a skeletal 
organization. The public needed assurances that a nuclear attack
*®NAC, DNH&W, RG 29, Vol 639, File 100-1-10, "Memo from F.F. 
Worthington to Brook Cleucton," 13 December 1948.
**Canada, House of Commons, Debates. Vol 2, November 11, 1949, 
p. 1701.
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could be survived; and to ensure survival, it was believed that 
planning at the community level was necessary. As the Financial 
Post reminded everyone, "civil defence is essentially self-help and 
self-defense and to be truly effective it has to get right down to 
the individual or community level."*® In late August a Federal- 
Provincial Conference on Civil Defence was convened, and a Federal- 
Provincial Advisory Committee was formed to assign respective 
responsibilities.*® The Advisory Committee agreed that provincial 
authorities should organize civil defence in municipal areas by 
providing information and training. The operational structure for 
civil defence would be based on community participation co­
ordinated by a municipal Civil Defence Committee. The federal and 
provincial governments would identify the procedures and teach the 
public how to master them. At the second meeting of the Federal- 
Provincial Advisory Committee on Civil Defence, held in February of 
1951, provincial responsibilities were confirmed and federal 
government responsibilities were defined. On this occasion, the 
transfer of federal responsibility for civil defence from the 
Department of National Defence to the Department of National Health 
and Welfare was also announced.
Paul Martin, Minister responsible for National Health and 
Welfare, did not welcome the transfer and found civil defence a
*®"Cities in Confusion, Wait on Ottawa Blueprint," Financial 
Post. 12 August 1950, p. 13.
*®NAC, PCO, RG 2, Series B-2, Vol 152, File D-lOO-C(l) 
"Dominion/Provincial Conference on Civil Defence.”
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"frustrating assignment."*® In Cabinet, he voiced the concern that 
civil defence involved tasks "beyond the resources" of his 
department, and that no decision had been made on how much the 
federal government would contribute to the program.*® Claxton 
suggested the federal subsidy should be as small as possible.** 
For the Department of Defence, building up combat strength took 
precedence over civil defence. Once responsibility for the program 
was passed on to another department, the military would assert that 
preventing an enemy attack was best achieved by increasing Canada's 
military strength and by pursuing arms production which would "lag" 
if funds and manpower were diverted for civil defence 
purposes
the Army was on-going.
The strained relationship between civil defence and
*7paul Martin, A Verv Public Life, vol. 2: 
(Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1985), p. 146.
So Manv Worlds
9 8 ,’PCO, RG 2, Series A 5a, Vol 2647 "Cabinet Conclusions" Vol 
23, (January 5 - 1 0  1951), p. 18. The Financial Assistance
Programme was not finalized until 1956. The arrangements divided 
program costs between all three levels of government: the province 
was responsible for 25% of the cost, the federal government covered 
50%, leaving the municipality to cover 25%. In 1959, the financing 
of civil defence projects was changed and the federal government 
assumed 75% of the cost of approved municipal projects. The 
provincial contribution was reduced to 15% and the municipality's 
to 10%. The change in the funding formula reflected a new duty 
given to the federal government, which assumed full responsibility 
for constructing a national air raid warning system.
**Ibid.
l®®Deacon, "Our Civil Defense: Are The Borders Barriers?" p.7.
^®^Federal responsibility for civil defence remained with the 
Department of National Health and Welfare until the retirement of 
Worthington in 1957. Responsibility was then divided between the 
Department of National Health and Welfare and the Privy Council 
Office, where an Emergency Measures Organization was created to
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During Worthington's cross-country speaking tours, he had told 
various associations and civic leaders that civil defence could 
protect from an atomic attack: the claim presupposed the ability to 
show how such survival was possible. To this end, Worthington had 
produced a small booklet to assist provincial and municipal 
authorities in implementing a civil defence plan. The booklet, 
entitled Organization for Civil Defence, presumed a low risk of an 
atomic attack on Canadian cities. Accepting that the real threat to 
world peace was a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the manual 
noted that Canada was in no immediate danger because the Soviet 
Union had neither the necessary number of aeroplanes nor a 
sufficient stockpile of atomic bombs to attempt "a series of 
saturation raids" on North America.^®® By conclusion then, any 
atomic attack on Canada would be diversionary, and its purpose 
would be to cause panic, thereby reducing the ability of the armed 
forces to participate in the European war. Mass hysteria would
supervise the construction of government shelters. With two 
agencies now concerned with civil defence, a bureaucratic struggle 
ensued, ending in 1959 with the merging of the Civil Defence 
Organization with the Emergency Measures Organization and the 
further splitting of civil defence duties between the departments 
of Justice, Defence and National Health and Welfare. The Emergency 
Measures Organization stayed a cedainet secretariat responsible for 
radiological defence, emergency transportation, emergency 
communications, war supplies, and the Civil Defence College, while 
at the municipal level, greater emphasis was placed on planning for 
peacetime emergencies. Changing the municipal emphasis from wartime 
preparedness to peacetime disaster response was in reaction to 
public apathy about civil defence. See Joseph Scanlon, "The Roller 
Coaster Story of Civil Defence Planning in Canada," Emergency 
Planning Digest (April - June, 1982); p. 5.
^®®Department of National Defence (Civil Defence) , Organization 
for Civil Defence. Manual No. l (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, October 
1950), p. 4.
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force the military "into putting more of their resources into home 
defence than the military risks warrant."i®® Civil defence 
preparedness would fortify public morale, ensuring that the will to 
win would not be broken.
Reassuring Canadians that their personal fears of an atomic 
bomb were exaggerated. Organization for Civil Defence provided a 
government-endorsed conception of what society would look like 
after an atomic attack. Here, the consequences were projected as 
localized disruptions, easily repaired with help from the outside. 
Thus, for most Canadians, society would be no different than its 
pre-attack form. The problem was that no one could predict where an 
atomic bomb would fall. Survival plans were promoted as a prudent 
precaution of municipalities but few cities were expected to be hit 
by an atomic bomb.
Since the danger of an atomic attack was so slim, only 
municipalities with a population of over ten thousand were 
encouraged to formulate a suzrvival plan. ̂ ®* Federal policy 
regarded the municipal civil defence committee as the "agency for 
action" but always in waiting, since volunteers would only be 
mobilized when the danger of an attack was imminent.^®® This 
feature of the survival plan limited widespread public
i®®IteM.
^®*In Canada, there were fifty-nine incorporated cities, towns 
and villages with a population of ten thousand or more. See 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada. 1951 vol. 1: 
Population (Ottawa; Queen's Printer, 1951) p. 3.
!®®Canada, House of Commons Debates. Vol 1, February 5, 1951, 
p. 92,
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participation in civil defence activities. For most of the 1950s, 
Canadians were not responsible for their own survival: individuals 
had been encouraged to leave preparedness measures with the 
municipalities. The plan outlined to the public how existing 
community resources could respond to an atomic attack and ensure 
their survival.
For many municipalities, however, interest in civil defence 
waxed and waned according to the degree of danger perceived in 
international affairs. This was the conclusion of Marijan Slaopek 
after assessing the response of Western Canadians to the Korean 
War. The Korean War brought a sense of urgency to civil defence 
planners, and in Edmonton and Calgary considerable debate occurred 
around the question of introducing compulsory civil defence 
training. After tracking various proposals for both evacuation and 
dispersal of people, and for identifying underground shelters, 
Slaopek noted that committee discussions never turned into actions. 
In time, the military stalemate in Korea alleviated peoples' fears 
of a world war and both Western Canadians and the media became more 
complacent toward civil defence.i®®
Lapsing into spells of apathy was a common occurrence for both 
the general public and civil defence officials. Some considered the 
apathy a psychological response to the consequences of an atomic
3^®®Marijan Slaopek, "Western Canadians and Civil Defence: The 
Korean War Years, 1950-1953," Prairie Forum (Spring 1989): 85.
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bomb, which were just "too horrible to face."®®® Paul Martin
regarded apathy as a symptom of the credibility problem:
No one would deny that it [civil defence] was important, 
yet it took a slew of films, brochures and speeches to 
convince not just the average Canadian, but elected and 
appointed officials, to take precautions.®®®
Civil defence was thought to be important because Cold War
propaganda attested to the possibility of an enemy attack; but the
probability of such an enemy attack was less convincing. In many
municipalities, Canadians felt no sense of urgency to prepare
either themselves or their cities to respond to an air attack which
might never happen. Trying to convince people otherwise had become
a priority of the federal civil defence program. In a 1954 progress
report for Cabinet, Martin observed that after six years of civil
defence re-activation, "not a single city in Canada...is even close
to being ready to cope with the consequences of the dropping of a
minimum 20 KT atomic bomb."®®* The lack of preparations was
attributed to the problem of credibility:
Our civil defence to date has been largely an 
'educational' effort, conditioning the general public to 
accept the possibility that destructive air attacks might 
come to our Canadian cities. Limited numbers of 
volunteers have been trained: limited amounts of supplies 
and equipment have been provided: but it must be frankly 
recognized that all our trained personnel, and all the 
supplies and equipment we have provided throughout all of 
Canada, would be entirely inadequate, even if they could
®®®Wallace Goforth and Sidney Katz, "If the Russians Attack 
Canada," Maclean's Magazine. 15 June 1951, p. 9.
®®®Martin, A Verv Public Life, p. 147.
®®*NAC, Paul Martin Papers, MG 33, Box 12, Vol 24, File "Civil 
Defence General," Memorandum to Cabinet on Civil Defence, November 
1, 1954. p. 3.
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be mobilized instantly at the desired point, to cope with 
one minimal atomic bomb dropped on one large or mid-size 
Canadian community.®®°
The problem was a matter of convincing Canadians of the need 
to implement civil defence measures and to train for emergency 
responses. The validity of civil defence measures was not seriously 
questioned until after the magnitude of destruction inherent in the 
hydrogen bomb became apparent; only then were civil defence 
measures criticized for lacking credibility. As Ernest Watkins of 
Saturday Niaht wrote in 1955: ".. .why expect me to be interested in 
arming a fire brigade with egg cups?"®®® The argument against the 
usefulness of civil defence moved from the remote possibility of an 
attack to the inadequacy of the measures.
Municipal Implementation of the civil Defence Program: The Example 
of the City of Port William
In the city of Fort William, a Civil Defence Committee was
established by City Council in September of 1950. The Committee,
composed of members from council and municipal services, namely
fire, police, and utilities, was given authority to "act in any
emergency," according to instructions given by either the
provincial or the national civil Defence offices.®®® The
Executive Committee envisioned a "large scale organization" for
®®®Ibid.. Appendix I, p. 3 (original emphasis).
®®®Ernest Watkins, "Civil Defence a Failure Until it Makes 
Sense," Saturday Niaht. 16 April 1955, p. 7.
®®®Thunder Bay City Archives (TBCA), City Clerk Files (CCF), 
Box 218, File 67, "Letter from Sid Blake to the Mayor and Council," 
September 19, 1950.
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civil defence in the city. In its structural plan, the Executive 
would be supported by four sub-sections: Administration and
Control, Supply, Transportation and. Military Defense and Air 
Protection. Each sub-section was to create a plan of action and all 
plans were to be consolidated into a master plan under the 
direction of the Executive Committee. In addition to the four 
working sub-committees of the Civil Defence Organization, a warden 
system, to liaise directly with the Executive, was also devised.
Two years would pass before a master plan for emergency 
measures was presented to the public of Fort William.®®® The plan 
was premised on one hour advance-notice of an enemy attack. The 
city was divided into six subdivisions, each having an "action 
depot" or "headquarter." Should an attack occur, civil defence 
rescue personnel would report to their respective action depots. 
The rescue teams each consisted of eight men and were responsible 
for "the release or extrication of trapped casualties in heavily 
damaged or dangerous buildings and debris."®®* The police were 
responsible for maintaining law and order, preventing panic, and 
stopping the flow of unnecessary traffic. The wardens were 
responsible for providing leadership among the civilian population. 
They would form self-help groups to fight fires, act as stretcher 
carriers, give first aid, provide reconnaissance parties and give 
information to "tactical and technical teams." Mobile units, such
®®®"Civil Defence Plan Here is Perfected," Daily Times Journal. 
19 March 1953, p. 1.
®®*lbid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
as the fire department's auxiliary forces and ambulance crews were 
to meet at one of three rendezvous points, so chosen because of 
their distance from the city center. The citizens of Fort William 
were assured that public health functions would be "immediately” 
restored following an attack or disaster.
Focussing public attention on how municipal services would 
respond to an atomic attack presumed that the city, or at least a 
part of the city, had not been damaged by an atomic bomb explosion. 
For those unlucky enough to be directly under the bomb's explosion, 
no help was available and civil defence never presumed to save 
these lives. Survival plans were about helping the survivors on the 
periphery of ground zero, where the use of civil defence officers 
could be justified. The preparedness plan was a functional response 
to the nuclear crisis. It involved the active participation of the 
public service sector which was given clear and concise roles to 
perform in case of an attack. The master plan outlined to the 
civilian population how an atomic attack could be managed, which in 
turn, helped legitimize a defence policy of nuclear deterrence.
Municipal civil defence committee participation in mock atomic 
attack exercises also attempted to assure the general public that 
their survival plan was effective. In this instance the goal of the 
exercises was to promote optimism and encourage trust in the civic 
planners. As the intent was to create routine out of a panic 
situation, the exercises themselves tested mainly the capabilities 
of the civil defence officials. In most instances the exercises
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were "physical endurance tests" based on sleep deprivation.®®® 
Although the Americans conducted actual evacuations in some cities, 
and concentrated on physically relocating and organizing a core 
federal executive to manage communications and industrial 
restructuring, the Canadian experience in the 1950s was much more 
theoretical. Often it was only the members of the municipal civil 
defence committee who participated in the mock attack exercises and 
care had to be taken at the federal level to ensure that the 
exercises did not interrupt the work week, when volunteer 
participation would, at best, be minimal.
The 1956 Alert Exercise II was poorly attended by Canadian 
civil defence organizations. The problem was that the three-day 
event (July 20-23) occurred in the middle of Canada's holiday 
season. The only province to have full participation was Ontario; 
all other provinces could only guarantee the participation of their 
provincial headquarters (except Newfoundland and Prince Edward 
Island), and one or two municipalities.®®® As usual, the exercise 
tested communication systems and control room procedures. The 
attack scenario was provided by federal umpires assigned to 
provincial headquarters and fully staffed municipal civil defence 
committees. At the appropriate moment, umpires provided mock field
®®®Interview with Mr. Paul Werk, former Provincial Civil 
Defence Regional Representative for Northwestern Ontario, interview 
by author, 18 November 1996, tape recording. Thunder Bay Art 
Gallery.
®®®NAC, Department of National Defence (DND), RG 29, Vol 665, 
File 106-2-15(1) "Canadian Pacific Telegram from Worthington to 
Major General Hatton."
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messages intended for local emergency service operations and, 
having provided the problem, would then monitor and evaluate the 
efficiency of the control rooms' response. For the 1956 exercise, 
emphasis was on the communist saboteur. For instance, a railway 
bridge was theoretically made inoperative because of sabotage and 
a radio station was blown up by saboteurs. Other mock problems were 
announced, such as: "enemy agents were making false announcements 
on the radio;" "subversive pamphlets, not in accord with Federal 
Civil Defence policy were being distributed;" "press stories were 
causing panic among evacuees, censorship not tight enough, can you 
do something" and; "government liquor store entered by local 
hoodlum encouraged by subversive element, request additional 
police."117 In every case, attention was drawn to the role of the 
civil defence officer in maintaining social control while for the 
public, civil defence emphasized the success of preparedness 
(theoretically) to deal with reported damages and casualties.
Support for civil defence preparedness was further solidified 
by federal training courses hosted at the Civil Defence College in 
Arnprior, Ontario. The College was key to mobilizing, training, and 
organizing civil defence at the community level. The week-long 
courses were aimed at educating the governing sector of a community 
by targeting municipal and service employees, and key personnel 
from private sector organizations. Between 1951 and 1952, fourteen 
persons from the City of Fort William would attend the Arnprior
^^7jiaC, DND, RG 29, Vol 665, File 106-2-15(2) "Exercise Alert 
III," Umpires Conference, July 4-5, 1956.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
C o l l e g e . T h e  impact of these training courses is seen in the
first Year End Report of the Fort William Civil Defence Committee
(1951). While at the inaugural meeting of the Executive Committee
the objectives of civil defence were defined as taking charge of
"any" disaster, maintenance of essential services, and providing
! emergency protection to the citizens of Fort William, these
practical goals were soon overshadowed as civil defence became more
narrowly defined as;
The protection of the home front by civilians acting 
under civil authority to minimize casualties and war 
damage and preserve maximum civilian support of the war effoZt.119
Training courses were also a key component of the public 
education program. Responsible members of society would attend the 
Civil Defence College for intensive indoctrination on issues of 
nuclear warfare. The participant, (for example, the neighbourhood 
pharmacist), became the regional representative and was expected to 
return back to the community to apply and disseminate the 
information to the local population.
Among those from Fort William who attended the first year of 
training courses were Merle Pringle and Margaret Stitt. Both were 
registered nurses; Miss Pringle was working for the Victoria Order
iiBpersons attending the Civil Defence College include: the 
Civil Defence Co-ordinator, the Fire Chief, two registered nurses, 
the city clerk and engineer, a cemetery supervisor, two Alderman, 
a Safety Supervisor of the Great Lakes Power Company, the president 
of Canada Car and Foundry Company, and Fort William's Hydro 
Electric Commissioner.
ii9t b c a , CCF, Box 218, File 67, Civil Defence Committee, Year 
-, December 15, 1951, p. 1.
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of Nurses and Miss Stitt was employed as an instructor at the 
McKellar H o s p i t a l . E a c h  would "graduate" from the course on 
Civil Defence in Atomic, Biological and Chemical Warfare. In turn, 
they conducted a seven-week course for members of the St. John 
Ambulance Corps and for registered nurses working in the city of 
Fort William. In total, 140 members of the community were "briefed 
on the vital components to national security, the preparation and 
training of civil defence workers and the management of casualty 
p r o b l e m s . I n  her opening speech to the audience. Miss Pringle 
noted that;
Panic may take more lives than the actual attack. A 
community which already has sound mental health and good 
intergroup relationships, if given factual knowledge 
about the possibilities, would be most able to reduce and 
prevent panic.
Management of fear was the most important message delivered by 
federal authorities to community representatives and to the public 
at large. Indeed, one of the first strategies of civil defence was 
to manage the public's emotions about the validity of nuclear 
warfare. Guy Oakes, author of The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and 
American Cold War Culture, contends that the civil defence strategy 
of "emotional management" was necessary to channel public anxieties
120"i4o Nurses Briefed on Defence Planning," Daily Tiroes 
Journal. 24 January 1952, pp. 1, 20.
izilbid.
izzibid.
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about nuclear war and convince people that their fears of 
annihilation were groundless.
Civil defence strategists created a false distinction between 
nuclear terror and nuclear fear. Nuclear terror was perceived as a 
problem of panic capable of destroying public morale, possibly 
igniting civil unrest and ensuring a Soviet victory. Nuclear terror 
would subvert the credibility of deterrence by undermining the will 
of the people to risk a nuclear war. Civil defence taught the 
public that nuclear terror was abnormal while nuclear fear was a 
normal response to the threat of a nuclear war. Everyone 
experienced fear, but fear could be managed through correct 
preparations and "self-mastery." Conquering nuclear fear was a 
persistent theme of civil defence. In 1960, responding to public 
fears of death by radiation, W.F. Scott, Chairman of the Ontario 
Provincial Emergency Measures Organization, sent a letter to every 
municipal clerk, civil defence co-ordinator, and fire chief in 
Ontario reminding everyone that radiation decays quickly, that 
fallout shelters provide protection, and that fear is vanquished by 
knowledge:
While dangers from radioactivity in war or peace can be 
very real, very definitely these dangers can be greatly 
reduced by knowledge, training and preparation. There is 
no need to panic or to throw up one's hands and feel that 
nothing can be done.
I23auy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American 
Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 46- 
71.
124.JBCA, CCF, Box 218, File 67(3), W.F Scott, Chairman, EMO- 
Ontario to All Municipal Clerks in Ontario, Civil Defence 
Coordinators, and Fire Chiefs, July 25, 1960.
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The general population was educated on the management of an 
atomic attack through mass mailings. Andrew Grossman, in his study 
of civil defence in the United States, argued that, "Mass education 
was a domestic propaganda enterprise; its fundamental purpose was 
to manage the way the general public understood atomic weapons and 
their e f f e c t s . T h e  same would hold true for Canada. In the 
city of Fort William, public education was a priority of the Civil 
Defence Committee. Within three months after its formation, a 
pamphlet, "for the information of the citizens of the Lakehead", 
was mailed through the utility bill.Unfortunately, no copy of 
the pamphlet has survived. A second mass mailing occurred between 
1951 and 1952, prior to the first hydrogen bomb test. Produced by 
the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, this thirty- 
two page booklet entitled, "Can You Survive?", was mailed to every 
household within the city limits of Fort William. On the inside 
cover was a personalized message, addressed to "The Citizens of 
Fort William from Mayor Badanai, Chief Executive of the City of 
Fort William Civil Defence Organization." The emphasis was on 
demystifying atomic warfare. If the "facts" were understood then 
Fort William could "avoid the possibility of panic or hysteria in 
the event of a c o n f l a g r a t i o n . w i t h i n  the text of the booklet
^Andrew D. Grossman, "Atomic Fantasies and Make-Believe War; 
The American State, Social Control, and Civil Defense Planning, 
1946-1952," Political Power and Social Theory 9 (1995); 108.
^26t b c a , Year End Report on Civil Defence, 1951, p. 7.
^^^canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Can You 
Survive?. n.d., (Frontispiece), TBCA, CCF, Box 218, File 67 "City 
of Fort William Civil Defence 1950-1955."
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citizens are told that, "they must have confidence in survival" and 
that;
...no training is required other than a training of your 
own mind so that you will be prepared without confusion 
- without the inordinate fear that could stifle your 
chances in an emergency.
The atomic bomb was conceptualized for the public as just a more
powerful conventional bomb - the arms race was not to worry people
because nuclear weapons could never destroy civilization;
...remember that the atom bomb is the modern scientific 
counterpart of the old bomb....it is important to note 
that virtually every modern device has limitations of one 
kind or another.... With its dynamic force and its rather 
violent radiation the atom bomb can do just so much and 
nothing more and the wonderful world we live in ̂ 1 1  
never be torn asunder by one or a million of them,
Civil defence was about social control. It was intended to
manage people's fears, imaginary or real, by reassuring the
individual that survival from a nuclear attack was possible.
The Subject of Radiation in Civil Defence Planning
The most glaring omission in the initial Fort William civil 
defence emergency plan was the issue of radiation. The civil 
defence concept of atomic warfare as a localized disaster was 
achieved in part by minimizing the danger from radioactive fallout 
and its associated health hazards. This in turn helped to depict 
the atomic bomb as just another, albeit more powerful, conventional 
weapon. Using Hiroshima's atomic bombing as the example, it was
I2®lbid. , p. 4. 
I2®lbid.. p. 5.
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common for civil defence tracts to equate the energy released by an 
atomic bomb to twenty kilotons of conventional high explosive 
trinitrotoluene (TNT) . The comparison fixates on the power of the 
explosion and ignores all qualitative differences. For instance, 
the heat produced by twenty kilotons of TNT reaches a maximum 
temperature of 5,000 degrees centigrade while the maximum 
temperature of an atomic bomb of equivalent yield is several 
million degrees c e n t i g r a d e . is the extreme temperature of 
the fireball that releases thermal radiation. During the Second 
World War, the blast of a one ton conventional bomb would collapse 
wooden houses within a radius of forty meters, whereas the blast of 
the Hiroshima bomb collapsed wooden houses within a radius of two 
k i l o m e t e r s . M e r g i n g  the distinction between nuclear and 
conventional weapons and down-playing the differences soothed 
people's concerns about surviving a nuclear war and muted appeals 
for the eradication of nuclear weapons.
While it is true that atomic bombs do kill by blast and fire, 
atomic bombs also kill by radiation. Three main arguments were used 
in civil defence tracts to counter public fears of death by 
exposure to radiation: government authorities emphasized that
radiation was a natural substance, that it had important medical 
benefits and that fear of radiation was more dangerous than 
radiation itself. Catherine Caufield's sometimes shocking book
ii°The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage 
Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, p. 32.
iiilbid.. p. 39.
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chronicles the United States' compromises between the need for
nuclear testing and the risks of radiation exposure. "By 1950,"
Caufield writes;
the public had largely accepted the government's line on 
radiation. The prevalent attitude was that it was 
unreasonable, dangerous, and perhaps traitorous, to rail 
against radiation and the bomb.i®^
The climate of fear and suppression of the individual's right 
to free speech was also prevalent in Canada. Over a span of eight 
months, from October 1950 to June 1951, the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police processed almost fifty-four thousand enquiries, screening 
civil servants and private-sector workers for communist 
affiliation.133 Throughout the 1950s, persons questioning the 
practicality of Canada's defensive alliances, the wisdom of 
economic and military integration with the United States or 
supporting neutrality risked being labelled a communist. Municipal 
civil defence organizations in Ontario received a steady flow of 
anti-communist literature that warned about the "communist 
apparatus" wanting to split the Western alliance, under the slogan 
"disarmament, neutrality, peace and independence in foreign 
affairs."134 Civil defence officials were reminded that the 
"single greatest deterrent to Communist expansion" was the armed
I32catherine Caufield, Multiple Exposures; Chronicles of the 
Radiation Aae (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 103.
i33Len Scher, The Un-Canadians. True Stories of the Blacklist 
Era (Toronto; Lester Publishing Ltd., 1992), p. 9.
134t b c A, CCF, Box 218, File 67(3), Alert. May 27, 1960, p. 1.
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forces of the United S t a t e s . 135 To question the defensive policy 
of nuclear deterrence and the hazards associated with nuclear
weapons testing was to expose oneself and one's family to 
accusations of being a communist a label that threatened access to 
employment.
On matters of radiation, Worthington depended upon information
released in the United States. Among the early unclassified
government reports. The Effects of Atomic Weapons was commended by
the United States' Civil Defence Office for providing "a source of
scientific information for technical personnel engaged in civil
defense planning activities."13® Prepared by the Department of
Defense and the United States' Atomic Energy Commission, the report
admits to the possibility of radioactive fallout but notes that:
...only in exceptional circumstances would the intensity 
of the activity be great enough to constitute a hazard 
upon reaching the ground. The evidence from the Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki atomic bomb explosions, where the height of 
burst was about 2,000 feet, is that casualties ascribable 
to the radioactive fall-out were completely absent.
However, if the bomb burst occurred relatively close to
the ground, a situation which would be uneconomical from 
the standpoint of the destructive effect.. .fall-out would 
have to be considered as a danger. 3̂7
^35Ibid., p. 2.
I36united States Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy 
Commission, The Effects of Atomic Weapons (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1950), preface.
337lbid., p. 35. The Committee for the Compilation of Materials 
on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
sets the detonation height at around 580 meters and 500 meters in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively (p. 53) . According to General 
Groves' autobiography. Now It Can Be Told, the 2,000 feet height of 
detonation was based on calculations made by members of the United 
States' Atomic Bomb "Manhattan" Project who were trying to 
determine the optimal height of burst for the atomic bombings (p.
I
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The influence of the Commission's report can be seen in 
Worthington's manual. When describing "the most likely form" of 
attack, Organization for Civil Defence encouraged municipalities to 
reject a premise of ground and underwater bursts (where radiation 
prevented "unprotected" workers from participating in rescue 
operations) , asserting that the most "effective use" (and therefore 
most probable use) of the atomic bomb was a high altitude 
detonation of two to three thousand feet above ground level. At 
this height, radiation would "not contaminate anything" but 
"widespread material damage" would o c c u r . ^^8 Worthington's manual 
was emphatic: "The main threat of the atom bomb is not
radioactivity but blast and f i r e . "^39
Organization for Civil Defence was the first civil defence 
manual available to provincial and municipal civil defence 
officials. This manual was quickly followed by a series of 
specialized civil defence booklets intended for individual 
municipal emergency services and were most often distributed during 
civil defence training courses. Minimizing the perceived danger of 
exposure to radiation was integral to each of the booklets. With 
the information provided in Radiation and Monitoring Fundamentals 
for the Fire Service it was hoped that any fear of radiation would
299). Between 9am and 4pm, in Hiroshima, "black rain" containing 
radioactivity and carbon from the firestorm came down painfully 
striking the burned, inflamed, and desquamated skin of the 
survivors.
^3®d n d , Organization for Civil Defence, p. 17.
I39ibid.. p. 19.
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turn into a "respect" for radiation. Written by the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs, the stated purpose of the booklet was 
to debunk some of the exaggerated statements made about radiation. 
Contending that public fears were groundless, firemen, with their 
"new knowledge on limits of radiation hazards," were called upon to 
dismiss the "widely featured concept" of "defeatism" and its "area 
of doom" defined by the "specter of radiation poisoning, 
engendering a take to the hills philosophy."^**®
For the fire service, fear of radiation was overcome by 
emphasizing the rapidity of radioactive decay. In Radiation and 
Monitoring Fundamentals, firemen learned about the limits of 
radiation by studying mathematical calculations that demonstrated 
the decreasing intensity of radioactive emissions until eventually, 
the radioactive atom changed into a non-radioactive atom. The 
rapidity of the transformation was such that firemen only had to 
wait "one to one-half minute," following an air burst, before 
"moving right in and rescuing the injured and trapped 
s u r v i v o r s . "^41 As with every other manual, a cautionary statement 
was provided about serious radiation hazards from underwater, 
underground, or ground bursts. Rescue operations would have to wait 
"a little longer" before entering damaged areas.
In 1952, the Registered Nurses Association of Ontario 
published Civil Defence Nursing Aspects to address the issue of
^40international Association of Fire Chiefs, Radiation and 
Monitoring Fundamentals for the Fire Service (New York: Midston 
House, 1952) , p. ii.
I4libid.
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radiation. The manual admitted that with "the present status of 
medical knowledge there [was] no specific therapy" to cure the body 
of the effects of radiation i n j u r y . care for victims of 
radiation sickness was mainly "emotional guidance" in which the 
nurse would "reassure" the victim that exposure to radiation was 
not necessarily fatal or permanently d i s a b l i n g .  4̂3 with no 
special medical treatment to teach, the manual appealed to the 
spirit of patriotism to gain the nursing profession's support for 
civil defence. Nurses were reminded that civil defence was a "vital 
component to national security" and that the "best possible 
deterrent" against an atomic attack was a well organized civil 
defence organization and an efficient military defence 
p r o g r a m . 144 gy participating in civil defence, nurses would 
"share, as responsible citizens, in the defence of d e m o c r a c y . " 1 4 5  
Civil defence statements about the minimal health risks from 
radiation exposure were brought into question following the 1954 
United States' hydrogen bomb test code-named BRAVO. This test was 
the first full scale hydrogen bomb detonation, although an earlier 
prototype had been exploded in 1952. The hydrogen bomb uses the 
heat generated from an atomic explosion to trigger a nuclear fusion 
explosion. The test was conducted on March 1 at Namu Island in the
i42sub-committee on Civil Defence of the Registered Nurses' 
Association of Ontario, Civil Defence Nursing Aspects (Toronto; 
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Bikini atoll of the Marshall Islands and was one thousand times 
more powerful than the Hiroshima atomic bomb. 145 (The United 
Nations mandated the Marshall Islands as a protectorate of the 
United States in the aftermath of World War Two. The islands became 
an off-shore site for the Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear 
weapons testing programme.) BRAVO spewed radioactive dust thousands 
of square miles across the Pacific Ocean and miles high into the 
stratosphere. 14̂  Within four hours of the explosion, fallout was 
settling on the people of Rongelap, a small island 115 miles east 
of Bikini, and on the crew of a Japanese tuna trawler, the Fukuryu 
Maru (Lucky Dragon) . The crew had been anchored approximately forty 
miles outside of the U.S. designated danger zone when the snow-like 
debris began falling.14® The fallout lasted for approximately 
five hours after which the crew of the Fukuryu Maru hosed the fine 
ash from its deck and headed for home. By the time they reached 
port all twenty-three crew members were suffering from nausea, 
headaches and bleeding gums, the classic signs of radiation 
sickness. News of the crews' radiation sickness touched off a tuna 
scare in Japan and the government responded by inspecting fish for 
radioactive contamination; in all, one million pounds of fish were
^46caufield, Multiple Exposures, p. 112.
*-47united States Atomic Energy Commission, L.L. Strauss, 
"Report by the United States Atomic Energy Commission on the 
Effects of High Yield Nuclear Eî^losions," February 15, 1955.
According to this statement by Lewis Strauss, the total territory 
contaminated by radioactive fallout was seven thousand sqpiare 
miles; also see, Caufield, Multiple Exposures, p. 113.
148Caufield, p. 144.
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d e s t r o y e d . 4̂9 por seven months the seamen remained in hospital 
receiving blood transfusions. Sadly, one member died in September 
of 1955. The United States ambassador to Japan sent a cheque for 
$2,800 to this man's widow as a "token of deep sympathy" and $2 
million was paid to the Japanese government for losses to the 
fishing industry.^®®
Damage control was quick and effective in the United States. 
"In the strictest of confidence," Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission told James Hagerty, President Eisenhower's 
press secretary, that the Japanese fishing trawler was actually a 
sophisticated "Red spy outfit" conducting illegal surveyance of the 
American test.*-®*- Strauss then added, "If I were the Reds, I 
would fill the oceans all over the world with radio-active fish. It 
would be so easy to dol"*-®^ in his press conference Strauss 
avoided any mention of Red spies or radioactive fish. He expressed 
"regret" for the crew members but reminded everyone that the 
Fukuryu Maru had "ignored the AEC warning" and were exposed to the 
fallout because of an "inadvertent trespass. "3®® The burns 
experienced by the fishermen, Strauss explained, were "due to the 
chemical activity of the converted material in the coral rather
*-49ibid., p. 114. 
!®®Ibid.
i®iQuoted in Robert Divine, Blowing on the Wind; The Nuclear 
Test Ban Debate. 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1978), p. 11.
*̂ ®3ibid. . p. 12.
®̂3lbid.
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than to radioactivity."*-®** Reassuring the public that radioactive 
fallout would quickly disappear, he concluded by praising the test 
for the military gains it had given to the United States. Perhaps 
the most important consequence of the BRAVO test was that the 
hazardous effects of radioactive fallout became declassified 
information. For civil defence proponents, the issue of 
preparedness against radioactive fallout could no longer be said to 
be of minimal concern to survival.
To sustain public support for continued nuclear weapons 
testing. Cold War rhetoric underscored the fear of being "too soft" 
as an indication of disloyalty by stressing that the effects from 
radioactive fallout were preferable to a Communist takeover.*-®® 
Nuclear adherents argued that ending nuclear weapons testing would 
be a danger to national security and that the proponents of test 
ban treaties were spreading Communist inspired propaganda; that 
maintaining nuclear weapons testing prevented the possibility of a 
Third World War; that testing preserved the peace and, as such, 
preserved life; that the injuries sustained by radioactive fallout 
from nuclear weapons testing represented a "slight risk" compared 
to the dangers of a nuclear war and; with continued testing, more 
information could be learned about radioactivity and eventually a 
"clean bomb" could be built which would kill with just blast and 
heat. Nor was the need for civil defence overlooked in the
i®*Weart, Nuclear Fear. A History of Images, p. 186.
*-®®The arguments for sustaining nuclear weapons testing were 
taken from Divine, Blowing on the wind, pp. 54-57.
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rhetoric. AEC Chairman Strauss surmised that any halt in hydrogen 
bomb testing "would cripple civil defence planning against possible 
nuclear war" on the grounds that "the survival of our 
people.. .depends.. .from the civil defence viewpoint, on information 
which is derived from our own carefully controlled nuclear 
tests."!®®
The ability of the hydrogen bomb to devastate vast areas of 
land and spread radioactive fallout hundreds of miles downwind 
undercut the prevailing idea of civil defence responding to a 
localized disturbance. The periphery could no longer be fixed to 
the radius of physical damage and the inability to know in advance 
which way the winds would carry the radioactive dust undermined the 
concept of mutual aid. Officially, civil defence never gave up on 
municipal emergency plans but after 1954, emphasis of the program 
gradually began to shift responsibility for wartime survival 
planning on to the family and the individual while natural disaster 
planning became the purview of the municipalities. Concern for 
rebuilding communities was dropped from the agenda; perception of 
life after a war with hydrogen bombs bordered on the realm of 
annihilation - life would not go on as it did before - the war 
would be a war of survival.
Civil defence now focussed on the survival of the individual 
and the Civil Defence College at Arnprior began emphasizing to the 
trainees the practicality of private shelters. Fort William Mayor,
!®®NAC, DNHfitW, Civil Defence Bulletin. Vol 59 (October-Movember 
1956), p. 4.
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Ernie Reed, attended a week long course at the College in 1961. 
Upon returning to Thunder Bay he addressed the Rotary Club, 
Kinsmen, and Kiwanis on the value of building basement shelters. 
The speech challenged the notion of annihilation and the 
destructive range of a nuclear bomb. Reed's paper went on to say 
that basement fallout shelters would reduce the immediate dose of 
radiation so that the individual "would not be seriously affected 
by the long-term effects of this radiation." Only a minority of 
people were expected to remain fourteen days in a shelter: the 
majority would stay below ground for only "a few days." Possible 
genetic damage resulting from a nuclear war would increase by one 
percent the number of children born defective. Simply put, 
radiation was not life threatening for those who took precaution. 
As Reed counselled his audiences on radioactive fallout, "remove 
the danger, remove the dust."!®7 That, as later studies would 
point out, was a forlorn hope.
!®7Thunder Bay Historical Museum, A88/1/1, "Civil Defence 
Speech, Sharing our Responsibility for Public Survival," and 
"E.M.O. Speech No. 2," by Ernie Reed, ca. 1961-1962.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Federal Civil Defence Policies for Civilian Protection 
The Policy of Evacuation
During the early 1950s, the key civilian role in a future 
atomic war was to sustain industrial production, and the main 
objective for civil defence was to "keep communities together as 
producing units."*-®® This was the opinion of Colonel Wallace 
Goforth, "an acknowledged expert" on atomic warfare. Goforth 
rejected any plan for mass-evacuation as both "naive and 
impossible" - naive because wholesale evacuation of target cities 
also meant abandoning "vital production centers." It was not that 
Goforth was underestimating the destructive capability of atomic 
weapons, but he was assuming that not all cities would be bombed; 
and since no one knew for certain when or where an atomic bomb 
would be dropped, it was not logical to encourage (as a plan for 
mass-evacuation would) the complete abandonment of industrial 
activity. As a defence strategy, Goforth argued that any support 
for mass-evacuation was "an open admission of defeat" and seriously
*-®®Wallace Goforth and Sidney Katz, "If the Russians Attack 
Canada," Maclean's Magazine 15 June 1951, p.72; also see Alden 
Bevier, "Civil Defence - The Role of Public Welfare," Canadian 
Welfare 30 (1 May 1954): 12-17. Colonel Goforth had been an
Assistant Professor of Political Economy at McGill University 
' before serving as Director of Weapon Requirements and Development 
; during World War Two. His main field of research focussed on winter 
; warfare. After the war, as Assistant Director General of Defence 
' Research, Goforth was a significant contributor to the 
i establishment of Canada's Defence Research Board. He retired from 
I the Army in 1947 but would provide the occasional commentary on 
I Canadian civil defence. See Captain D.J. Goodspeed, A History of I The Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
' 1958), pp. 28-44.
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jeopardized Canada's survival as a nation. In the next war Canada 
would no longer be beyond the range of bomber aircraft; industry 
had to come to grips with the fact that its factories had become 
part of a "front-line position" and would have to "be held" at all 
cost. A policy of mass-evacuation, Goforth reasoned, would only 
encourage workers to "desert" their jobs under the "threat of enemy 
fire."
Goforth also argued against the logistics of a mass- 
evacuation, contending that it was "physically impossible to 
hurriedly evacuate a large city," especially if that city had been 
bombed. From a planner's perspective, undamaged highways would 
quickly clog, closing down access routes for emergency goods and 
relief workers. No one denied that a mass-evacuation would 
interfere with production and that "the effect upon the 
manufacturing potential would be disastrous," but the possibility 
of "select groups" being evacuated was not without its merit.!®® 
Pregnant women, the elderly, and young children were cited as 
legitimate evacuees for whom assistance in relocation outside of 
"target" cities was not unconscionable; other "non-essential" 
workers could voluntarily leave but would have to depend on their 
own initiatives in finding accommodations. A spokesperson for civil 
defence noted that the logistics of a partial evacuation policy 
were considered manageable, although the public needed to be 
prepared to expect that "the summer cottage population [was] likely
!®®K.B.F. Smith, "It Can Happen Here," Industrial Canada 52 
(February 1952): 34.
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to increase greatly."!®® Civil defence officials were confident 
that "thousands" of people could be housed in conditions not 
exactly "comfortable," but "livable".!®!
Although federal civil defence officials had been unofficially 
supporting a policy of evacuation from as early as 1954, it was 
never publicly stated until after a civil defence bilateral 
planning meeting between Canada and the United States in the early 
spring of 1956.!®^ Thirteen potential target cities were 
identified for Canada. Each city would have to create its own 
evacuation plan, although the Federal government was willing to 
provide municipalities with "a master plan applicable to evacuation 
problems" and a "team" of federal advisors.!®®
Canada's master plan for evacuation was graduated and divided 
into four phases: pre-attack, alert, bombing, and post-bomb. The 
plan was based on the assumption that the Distant Early Warning 
radar line would provide a forewarning of thirty minutes. The pre­
attack phase plan called for evacuation of non-essential personnel 
to pre-determined locations approximately fifty miles beyond city 
limits. "Vital" industries would doubled their shifts and begin 
moving equipment into "second-line" plants. The "alert signal" 
phase planned notification of those cities designated for attack.
!®®Ibid.
!®!Rarvey W. Adams, "Civil defence and your life," Saturday 
Night. 11 June 1955, p. 7.
!62"h o w  will we leave our cities if an H-bomb war threatens," 
Financial Post. 27 October 1956, p. 16.
!®®Ibid.
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All traffic would be prevented access into the city and industry 
would begin full evacuation to their "branch plants." During the 
bombing phase, workers would be sheltered "in moderate damage 
areas," considered to be about twenty miles outside of city limits. 
Workers were expected to contribute to the post-bomb phase of civil 
defence rescue operations. The gradual evacuation plan did not 
emphasize saving lives but rather the continuation of industrial 
production, which of its own initiative had decentralized during 
peace-time.
Evacuation plans never did become a priority on municipal 
agendas. At the federal level, civil defence officials were 
prodding their provincial counterparts to "provide leadership" and 
bring pressure to city councilors. A year after the evacuation 
policy had been publicly announced, none of the thirteen designated 
potential target areas had addressed the issue.!®** outlying 
centres had no knowledge of their roles and city dwellers had no 
idea of what was required of them. For historian James Eayrs, false 
expectations had been built into the evacuation plan that 
discredited its feasibility: it was absurd, Eayrs argued, to
suppose that the inhabitants of metropolitan Toronto could be 
evacuated to some safe haven in the Bruce Peninsula with twenty 
minutes' warning.!®® Eayrs maintained that Federal "infatuation" 
with the evacuation program was a deliberate diversion for civil
Plans alarm system against missile attacks," Financial 
Post. 14 September 1957, p. 19.
!®®Jeunes Eayrs, "Defending the Realm: Memo to General Graham," 
Canadian Forum 38 (October 1958): 168.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
defence officials who were "abdicating" their responsibility for 
providing "worthwhile protection" to Canadians. Evacuation policy 
assigned full responsibility for civilian protection to the 
municipalities, while absolving the federal government from any 
meaningful participating role.
Worthington's 1956 announcement of Canada's decision to adopt 
the evacuation policy was rationalized by citing the destructive 
potential of the hydrogen bomb. Facing "complete annihilation" of 
anything within a three-mile radius, evacuation was the only 
possibility: shelters would not save lives. Technological
advancement in missile delivery systems eventually reduced warning 
time to under fifteen minutes for land-based missiles and to no 
warning from submarine launched missiles. The diminished warning 
time combined with a nuclear strategy based on surprise attack 
nullified Canada's evacuation policy.*-®® The evacuation policy 
was superseded by a shelter building program. The change of policy 
brought an insoluble contradiction to the role of civil defence: to 
argue that evacuation was the only way to avoid annihilation in 
target cities, and then promote a shelter program for those cities, 
created an illogical construct in the public psyche. One of the 
main criticisms of the civil defence program was its inability to 
produce realistic and convincing plans for civilian protection 
against nuclear warfare.
*-®®Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, military nuclear 
strategy adopted a defence based on an escalated response to 
superpower tension. Escalation theory allowed for a brief revival 
of the evacuation option.
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It was an unavoidable dilemma for weapon systems analyst 
Herman Kahn who wrote On Thermonuclear War while on leave from the 
RAND Corporation. Kahn had postulated that in the climate of the 
Cold War, neither world government nor disarmament nor arms control 
was possible. A nuclear country had to find the means to deter its 
adversary from starting a thermonuclear war or from exhibiting 
intolerable provocation. The work hinged on accepting the 
assumption that a nuclear war did not presume mutual annihilation. 
Kahn's entire approach to nuclear strategy was based on an 
understanding of nuclear war as an "unprecedented catastrophe," but 
not a limitless one. The book stimulated public discussion on civil 
defence, in part due to its writing style which was intended to 
jolt the reader into "thinking about the unthinkable."
Kahn observed that people had a visceral reaction to civil 
defence, automatically dismissing the whole subject and with it the 
possibility of nuclear war. People "do not want to face the reality 
of potential thermonuclear war...[they] prefer deterring it, 
abolishing it, wishing it away, thinking it away, ignoring it, and 
denying its existence as a p r o b l e m .  "*-®7 people produced 
psychological blocks but especially frustrating for Kahn was the 
belief in the "naive" assumption that war "must be all-out and 
uncontrolled."!®® For Kahn, civil defence provided the best
!®7nerman Kahn, "A Rational Basis for Decision Making on Civil 
Defense Policy," Behavioral Science and Civil Defense Conference. 
Washington D.C., October 1962, p. 23. This article was republished 
with minor revisions as "A Debate on the Question of Civil 
Defense," Commentary 33 (1962): 1-23.
!®®Kahn, "A Rational Basis," pp. 36, 39.
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possibility for surviving a controlled or "limited general war" as 
distinguished from the spasm war: "In a spasm war each side is 
trying to get rid of all its weapons as fast as it can in sort of 
an orgiastic spasm of destruction."*-®® Civil defence was regarded 
as "insurance" to fall back on in case an avoidance of nuclear war 
failed. But regardless of how elaborate the preparations for civil 
defence were, there remained one major flaw: it could not
demonstrate rigorously the plausibility of survival. Even after all 
the analysis of all the innumerable scenarios, survival remained a 
leap-of-faith - "faith in the ability of people to improvise, to 
meet emergencies reasonably intelligently...to rise to the 
occasion. "*-7® civil defence was never able to convince people 
fully that preparedness measures could protect against the hydrogen 
bombs or provide a meaningful vision of society after nuclear war. 
This was apparent in the public's response to home shelters.
The Policy of Home Shelters
A viable fallout shelter system for the civilian population 
was never realized in Canada. The rationale for not building was 
justified on monetary grounds, even though it was the opinion of 
the Defence Department that without shelters there would be no 
survival in a nuclear war. Having quickly recognized the 
unacceptably high cost associated with a national shelter system, 
the federal civil defence committee muted the public shelter
*-®®Ibid.. p. 41.
170Ibid.. pp. 30-1.
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option, established for itself an informational role, and laid the 
responsibility for survival on the individual's initiative to 
construct home shelters.
During the early years of the 1950s, usage of the term, 
"fallout" shelter had yet to replace the term "air raid" shelter. 
Air-raid shelters were discouraged from being built because of the 
civil defence policy for evacuation and the association of 
sheltering with "non-productive i d l e n e s s .  "*-71 While the 
inefficiency argument lost its preponderance as death by 
radioactive fallout became more generally accepted, the economic 
contention that building home shelters would be an exorbitant 
expense on the government was never lost on civil defence planners. 
Civil defence estimates for a home shelter program hovered around 
$2 billion and that did not include the protection of the work 
f o r c e . !72 A program to build home shelters would cost more than 
the economy could afford, and so the government recommended but did 
not mandate homeowners to build their own.
Without a co-ordinated effort by government to legislate 
fallout shelters for new residences, shelter construction remained 
very much a voluntary decision. Canadians could, if they chose to, 
build their own shelter and a home improvement loan was made 
available under the National Housing Act, provided the shelter was
!7!john S. Morgan, "Citizen Defence," Canadian Forum. 30 (March 
1951): 270.
!72ciive Baxter, "CD Speed-up means big cash spree: 'Sweetener' 
could mean more shelters," Financial Post. 2 September 1961, p. 2.
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built using a Federally approved anti-blast or fallout design.
Some Ontario municipalities were in favour of building fallout
shelters for their residents on a local improvement basis but
shelter construction by municipalities was not possible under the
current l e g i s l a t i o n . T h e  Local Improvement Act applied only to
the cost of certain projects undertaken on public property, and
shelters were not a specified category. Income tax exemptions for
the cost of construction was considered by the Federal Government
but Cabinet considered the scheme a benefit for high income earners
and decided that "the privilege of income tax deduction should not
be the inducement to get people to do the desirable t h i n g . in
the end it was agreed to make home improvement loans available
under the National Housing Act. The role of civil defence
organizations was to ensure:
that homeowners be presented in every reasonable way with 
the facts concerning their own safety in the event of air 
attack and the value to them of home shelters at modest 
costs, which would be eligible for financing by home 
improvement loans.
Prior to the shelter craze brought on by the Berlin Wall 
Crisis (1961), the only construction firm to sell home shelters
^73iishelters and the public," Financial Post. 17 February 1962, 
p. 64.
I74iip̂ ĵ  Shelter on Tax Bill? Law Says You Can't Do It," 
Financial Post. 18 November 1961, p. 18.
i^Spco, RG 2, Series A 5a, Vol 2647 "Cabinet Conclusions: Item 
No 23, Civil Defence; financial aid for home shelters," Vol 78, 17 
May 1960 to 30 June 1960, p. 7.
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aggressively was the Consolidated Building C o r p o r a t i o n . I n  
1959, Consolidated anticipated building seven-hundred homes in the 
sub-division of Regency Acres in Aurora, Ontario, and offered 
future homeowners the option of a shelter if ordered prior to the 
start of construction. The $1,500 price tag would be added to the 
purchasing cost. Consolidated claimed that the shelter would 
protect against fallout and give "reasonable protection against 
blast." The shelter's design came from United States' civil defence 
pamphlets because no official blueprints were yet available in 
Canada, although by 1962 Canada had fifty approved anti-blast and 
fallout shelter designs.
Civil defence officials had no accurate method for determining 
the exact number of shelters constructed in Canada. Home owners 
wanted to keep their private shelters secret for fear of public 
ridicule, an increased property tax assessment, or fear of a 
possible intrusion by neighbours should a nuclear war b e g i n .  
Putting aside the tax avoidance rationale, to build or not to build 
a home fallout shelter was closely linked to one's perception of 
the credibility of a nuclear attack. The Berlin Wall Crisis was the 
first major international crisis, since the Korean War, to raise
^^^Leonard Bertin, "A-blast shelter in new houses: can you 
survive?" Financial Post. 24 January 1959, p. 24.
Shelters and the public," p. 64.
"Who's building fallout shelters where, for how much?" 
Maclean's Maaazine. 2 December 1961, p. 73; "Shelters and the
public," p. 64.
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the threat of direct warfare between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.
Suddenly exposed to the possibility of annihilation, people
began to exhibit anti-social behaviour as social cohesion was
disrupted under the rubric of self-preservation. Home shelters did
not inspire Canadians to rally together against the external enemy
but rather, the public began to internalize the enemy. People spoke
of barring neighbours from shelters. Reports began to circulate:
building materials were being delivered by night; workmen were
being smuggled in as T.V. r e p a i r m e n d e c o y  shelters were being
built just for fooling n e i g h b o u r s a n d  wives were taught to
use guns to shoot at possible i n t r u d e r s . The anti-social
behaviour pointed to the fact that the identification of the enemy
had become misplaced.
Social cohesion weakened in the anticipation of a nuclear
crisis. Fear and duty of self-preservation occasionally spilled
into blatant prejudice. A full page opinion editorial in Saturday
Night told Canadians that if they were white and Christian they had
a "duty to humanity to survive" and justified it accordingly:
Colored peoples have still to emerge from barbarism. (I 
do not mean this as an insult, I am just stating facts.) 
Admittedly, the Chinese once had a very fine 
civilization, but today they have become more barbaric 
than anyone. Of course, we share this particular quality 
of Whiteness with the Europeans and Americans, but I do
1G°C. Knowlton Nash, "Where fright feeds on fright," Financial 
Post. 7 October 1961, p. 25.
^®^"Who's Building fallout shelters," p. 73.
iŝ Ibid.
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not think any of them can claim as great a duty to 
survive as Canadians. Many are quite degenerate or 
neurotic. And, unlike some countries, we will be quite 
innocent of causing any holocaust.i®®
Although few would admit to building shelters, fewer still 
were willing to discuss their reasons. A survey of fourteen of 
Canada's largest cities was undertaken by the Financial Post to 
guage the Canadian reaction to the shelter craze. The general 
finding was that few were taking seriously their survival of a 
nuclear war. Collectively, the cities counted 420,000 homeowners 
but only thirty-six of them had acquired permits to build fallout 
shelters.!®* While few Canadians were willing to publicly admit 
to constructing a shelter, construction firms were confirming 
sales. National Survival Limited of Regina claimed to have sixty 
orders for home shelters ranging in price from $365 to $695. In 
Toronto, Family Fallout Shelter Limited had sold twenty shelters 
with another forty customers waiting for delivery. Eaton's 
department store was not selling shelters but did offer a line of 
shelter furnishings and the Simpson-Sears department store had a 
model shelter on display and claimed to have sold five at $514 
each.!®® The secrecy of home shelter construction was used by 
civil defence officials to defend the practice of extrapolating the 
number of private shelters as measured by the number of requests
!®®Michael Sheldon, "Point of view: should you build a fallout 
shelter?" Saturday Night. 20 January 1962, p. 44.
184113^^ the only underground thinking in Canada is about 
basement bars and subways," Financial Post. 7 October 1961, pp. 25- 
6.
!®®Ibid.
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for shelter protection plans. By 1962, over one million copies of 
the publication, "Your Basement Fallout Shelter," had been 
distributed on request to groups and i n d i v i d u a l s . C i v i l  
defence officials estimated that more than 1,000 private shelters 
had been constructed in 1 9 6 1 . Yet figures released by National 
Housing Act officials showed that to January 31, 1962, only sixty- 
two Canadians had applied for loans to build shelters in new homes 
with another ninety-four shelters constructed in existing houses 
under home improvement loans.!®® By 1963, civil defence officials 
were adamant that they knew of at least twenty-five hundred 
shelters in Canada. If built according to approved civil defence 
designs each shelter would be capable of housing five persons. With 
fewer than 20,000 Canadians theoretically protected, the policy of 
voluntary shelter construction was a dismal failure, even by the 
more generous estimates of civil defence officials. As early as 
1963, the federal promotion of fallout shelter construction was 
being labelled a "wasted effort."!®® ^ year later, Maclean's 
Magazine was calling the home fallout shelter a "prematurely dug 
grave, a hole to be buried alive in. "!®° Herman Khan would
!®6"sheiters and the public," p. 64.
!®?Ibid.
!®®Clive Baxter, "$2 Million Still in Post for Builders,"
Financial Post. 12 May 1962, p. 4.
!®®Clive Baxter, "If the Big Bomb Drops, Can EMO Cope?"
Financial Post. 19 October 1963, p. 51.
!90"Let's stop kidding ourselves about civil defense,"
Maclean's Magazine. 2 November 1964, p. 4.
I [
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
attribute the lack of public interest in shelter protection to the
idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy; namely, if you build shelters
you will have to use them.!®!
Fallout shelters generated considerable discussion but never
translated into widespread construction. Resistance to fallout
shelters peaked during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. As social
psychologist Lester Grinspoon commented;
This [the Cuban Crisis] nuclear confrontation, which 
probably brought the world closest to the brink of a 
nuclear war, was not associated with increased shelter 
activity, but rather with the continuance of its de­
emphasis and a shift towards disarmament in some 
circles.!®^
One reporter was to explain the apathy and denial of a nuclear 
threat as "public boredom with the issue."!®® There could be no 
serious inquiry into a defence policy for Canada because of the 
commitment to support an American nuclear-weapons based alliance. 
"The reality could no longer be discussed and the unreality of more 
accustomed paths provided a refuge."!®* issues such as home 
fallout shelters were discussed in formal terms without realistic 
consideration for the value of the action.
!®!Rahn, "A Rational Basis" p. 45.
!®^Lester Grinspoon, "Fallout Shelters and the Unacceptability 
of Disquieting Facts," in The Threat of Impending Disaster; 
Contributions to the Psychology of Stress, ed. George H. Grosser 
(Cambridge; Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1964), p. 
118.
!®®Kenneth McNaught, "Boredom With The Bomb," Saturday Night. 
August 1964, p. 15.
!®*Ibid.. p. 16.
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In 1965, Federal Emergency Measures officials admitted that 
the home shelter programme had been unsuccessful.!®® The excuse 
given for the failure was monetary; it was the expense incurred in 
constructing a shelter that stopped people from building rather 
than a lack of conviction in such a project's utility. The federal 
solution was to reconsider and undertake a public shelter 
programme.
Th# Policy of Public Shelters
Initially the cost of maintaining public shelters was 
considered prohibitive. There was also the issue of provocation: a 
national program of public shelter building could be misconstrued 
as preparations for an offensive attack against the Soviet Union, 
especially if done in conjunction with the United States' public 
shelter identification programme.!®® The dismal failure of 
convincing people to build home fallout shelters meant that public 
fallout shelters became, for civil defence, the best form of 
protection against a hydrogen bomb. Revising the argument in favour 
of public shelters was done in order that they be seen as 
contributing to the prevention of nuclear war. Instead of provoking 
an attack, public fallout shelters strengthened deterrence since an 
enemy would hesitate to attack if threatened by retaliation. This 
reversal of argument was promoted by Robert Curry, Director of the
!®®"National Fallout Shelter Survey," EMO National Digest. 5.2 
(April 1965): 6 .
^^^Knowlton C. Nash, "Should we start a building binge in bomb 
shelter?" Financial Post. 18 July 1959, p. 19.
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Privy Council's Emergency Measures Organization. Curry dismissed as 
"delusional" any consideration that precautionary measures led to 
war; "We want the world to know that we are ready [and] that we 
will not be taken by surprise."!®^ Public shelter preparations 
were now regarded as defensive actions intended for the "thoughtful 
and intelligent enemy."!®® Such an enemy would hesitate to attack 
a country that had made emergency plans and preparations. 
Worthington considered the argument of 'public shelters as a 
provocation' to be based on a "fatalistic attitude" arising from 
"ignorance" and "nonsense;" he believed that "We are the flea on 
the elephant's ear so far as Russia is concerned."!®® In 
separating Canada's civil defence program from a North American 
context, Worthington was minimizing the provocation argument.
The preventative argument justified the creation of the 
National Shelter Plan (1961), which authorized the civil defence 
program to undertake a survey of all federal buildings to assess 
their capability to provide shelter from r a d i a t i o n . U n d e r  the 
supervision of the federal Emergency Measures Organization, the 
Department of Public Works was assigned the task of identifying 
potential public fallout shelters among existing federal buildings,
!®?Terence Robertson, "Watch for Big 'War Citadels' Contracts 
Soon," Financial Post. 21 January 1961, p. 2.
!®®Ibid.
!®®F.F. Worthington, "After All the Argument War May Come," 
Saturdav Nioht. 10 June 1961, p. 32.
200"Mass Raid Shelters Are on CD Program," Financial Post. 5 
August 1961, p. 2.
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while the Army was to build blast resistant shelters to ensure the 
continuation of government during and after a nuclear war.
Major-General Hugh Young, Deputy Minister of Public Works, 
announced that fallout protection would become standard for all new 
federal government offices and that shelter blueprints had been 
prepared for the Agriculture Administrative Building, the new 
Unemployment Insurance Building, Transport Building, Northern 
Affairs and National Resources Buildings and the Department of 
National Health and Welfare in the Ottawa suburban area known as 
Tunney's Pasture. During the summer of 1961, some 5,000 
federal buildings were surveyed for fallout p r o t e c t i o n . ^ 0 2  
However, a building that offered adequate fallout protection could 
not be considered a public shelter, since the survey did not 
consider ventilation, sanitation, cooking facilities, or whether or 
not it has sufficient floor space.®®® Fallout shelters also 
required heating equipment and stockpiled food, water, and medical 
supplies. The financial costs were astronomical. A rough 
calculation estimated the cost of food at $250 million for a two 
week supply of canned goods for eighteen million Canadians.®®*
Following the survey of federal public buildings during the 
summer of 1961, the public shelter component of the National
®®!"Fallout Shelters in Ottawa Buildings," Monetary Tiroes. 
December 1961, p. 16.
®®®"Shelters and the Public," p. 64.
®®®Ibid.
2®*"h o w  They'll Treat Atomic Casualties," Financial Post. 2 
September 1961, p. 10.
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Shelter Plan went dormant while government shelter construction
remained active. Historian Desmond Morton was to observe that;
All at once it was governments, not Communist 
sympathizers or the small community of pacifists, who 
were bent on making people's flesh creep at potential 
nuclear horrors - all in the name of justifying costly 
and inconvenient precautions.®®®
In 1965, survey teams were once again organized, this time to 
assess the fallout protection of provincial and municipal 
buildings, along with other suitable privately and publicly owned 
buildings, such as apartments, commercial offices, schools and 
churches. Charles Drury, Minister of Industry and Chairman of the 
Cabinet Committee on Emergency Plans in Lester Pearson's Liberal 
government, justified the renewal of the survey with the 
observation that most federal buildings did not correspond with 
population distribution. Drury was also hoping that a national 
public fallout shelter programme would help in obtaining public 
support for civil defence.®®® As Worthington had already noted, 
"A shelter program in Canada would provide work for a great many 
people which is not a bad idea in itself."®®^ The survey was 
expected to take three years for completion, yet as late as 1978,
®®®Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (Edmonton: 
Hurtig Publishers, 1985) p. 245.
®®®Paul A. Faguy, "National Developments in the Emergency 
Measures Programme," EMO National Digest. 5.2. (April 1965): 19.
®®^Worthington, "After All the Arguments" p. 31.
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summer students were still being hired by Public Works to survey 
commercial sites.®®®
All survey work was done through the Department of Public 
Works except in Saskatchewan where it was contracted to the Civil 
Engineering Department at the University of Saskatchewan. The 
intent of the expanded National Shelter Plan was to produce 
Provincial Master Shelter Plans and then Community Shelter Plans 
for the entire country. Upon its completion, the Emergency Shelter 
Preparedness Program had identified over twenty-one million spaces 
as "fallout proof" but none attained actual designation as a public 
fallout shelter.®®® Only the shelters set aside for government 
officials were actually readied for occupation.
Th# Policy of Government Shelters
Through the "Continuity of Government Program" (1961), 
Regional Emergency Government Headquarters were built in each 
province. The construction of the provincial "war citadels" (as 
they came to be called) were designed to provide "operational 
capability" for a small core of federal, provincial, and army 
personnel who would direct emergency measures within a province in 
the event of an attack on Canada. Regarded as the largest defence 
construction contract to be offered for public tender, total
yp (Qp a countdown," Maclean's Magazine. 1 October
1979, p. 26.
®°®Charles White, "Do-it-yourself survival: Canada's civil
defence is far behind that of many other countries," Canada and the 
World. 49 (1984): 20.
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construction cost was estimated at $5 million with another $7 
million for electronic communication equipment.®!® It was 
calculated that the citadels could protect against radioactive 
fallout but not a nuclear blast. ®ü Not even the federal 
government shelter at Carp, Ontario, a five-story concrete-encased 
underground structure, could withstand a high yield nuclear 
explosion.®!®
These emergency government facilities could hypothetically
protect politicians and army personnel from the short-term effects
of a nuclear war. Civil defence officials rarely distinguished
between short and long term survival, and neither did civil defence
preparations venture into inquiries of public adaptation to the
post-nuclear war environment. More important was creating the
impression of a nuclear exchange as a brief skirmish and temporary
abnormality, which was the impression that the Director of the
Privy Council's Emergency Measures Organization, R.B. Curry, gave
in rationalizing the initiative to build government shelters:
The first thing the public would clamor for in the event 
of an attack would be information as to whether the 
government was in being, what it intended to do and 
whether it was capable of supplying services such as aid 
for stricken areas.®!®
2!®Terence Robertson, "We Could Take Atomic Blow, Most of Us 
Would Survive," Financial Post. 21 January 1961, p. 34.
®!!"Shelters and the Public," p. 64.
®!®Clive Baxter, "Despite apathy, civil defence thrives and 
expands," Financial Post. 18 September 1965, p. 26.
®!®Robertson, "Watch for Big War Citadels," p. 2.
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Burled under the 'we can rebuild' response to nuclear warfare was
an implied priority of preserving government. This unspoken
agreement conveniently avoided all discussion on the type of
government most likely to emerge in the post nuclear world. Because
of this underlying 'collusion,' it was easier for civil defence to
restructure the role of the army away from assisting civilians and
toward protecting government from civilian unrest:
Each control centre will be surrounded by a widely flung 
defence perimeter guarded by the Army. Inside, there will 
be food, medical supplies and all the necessities to 
sustain life for prolonged periods. The provincial 
citadels will be purely functional, designed to enable 
administrations to deal efficiently with war problems.
There will be no accommodation for families. Men 
designated to go underground are forbidden to disclose 
this information to even their closest relatives.®!*
The government recognized an implicitly Hobbesian view of a post-
nuclear world. For Prime Minster Diefenbaker (for whom the federal
shelter was christened the Diefenbunker), a drawn out nuclear war
would reduce the functions of government to "allocating surviving
resources between competing civilian and military demands."®!®
The Diefenbunker was four stories deep and could hold over three
hundred people for thirty days. The federal shelter was
decommissioned in 1994.
®!*Ibid.
®!®John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada. vol. 2: The Years of
Achievement. 1956-1962 (Scarborough: Macmillan-Nal Publishing Ltd., 
1976), p. 246.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
Conclusion to federal civil defence policies.
During the 1950s, civil defence plans were premised on evacuation 
following warning of an enemy attack. The success of the October 4, 
1957, launching of Sputnik I into orbit by the Soviet Union 
proclaimed the arrival of the intercontinental missile and 
fundamentally changed previous suppositions about civil defence 
arrangements. Planners recognized the need for change but were 
unable to produce viable alternatives. In theory, a sheltered 
population was more likely to survive a nuclear war but the reality 
of survival preparedness was rarely explored in public. The 
unavoidable fact was that a national fallout shelter program, 
either in private homes or in public buildings was too costly an 
undertaking for too little assurance of survival. Clive Baxter best 
summarized the most salient impasse: "the cost of a meaningful 
shelter program makes the underground insurance just too expensive 
for the calculated risk."®!®
The government's half-hearted response for a national survival 
plan only provoked alarm and division within the population. In 
order to convince people to build shelters, the horrors of a 
nuclear war had to be emphasized. Once again, civil defence was 
caught in an illogical bind, where "the absurdity and amateurism of 
the precautions played counterpoint to the horror of the 
threat."®!^ As the seriousness of radioactive contamination 
became general knowledge, the utility of civil defence was
®!®Baxter, "$2 Million Still in Pot for Builders," p. 1. 
®!^Morton, A Military History, p. 245.
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challenged for fostering the dangerous illusion that protection was 
possible in a nuclear war. Critics argued that civil defence 
planning lulled people into false feelings of security. The 
disquieting element for civil defence officials was that the 
illusion of protection was no longer capable of garnering public 
support for a policy of nuclear deterrence. Indeed, the exact 
opposite was occurring and people became less convinced that 
deterrence could prevent a nuclear war.
The inability of civil defence promoters to gain widespread 
public support and participation in making shelter preparations for 
the possibility of a nuclear war would eventually lead to the 
withdrawal of civil defence preparedness measures from the public 
sphere. Refashioned as a provider of emergency assistance for 
natural disasters, the civil defence portion of the revamped 
Emergency Measures Organization would grow increasingly 
paternalistic toward Canadian's well being with the federal 
government undertaking the preparations for survival on behalf of 
citizens. First and foremost in the equation was its own survival. 
Civil defence had evolved from protection of the civilian 
population to the protection and survival of the chosen few.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion
The aeroplane radically altered the ways of organized warfare. 
During the interim years, between the First and Second World Wars, 
armed forces came to realize that air raids could weaken an enemy 
by terrorizing its citizens, creating panic and decreasing war 
productivity. With the threat of indiscriminate death ever present, 
the morale of the civilian population became a significant issue 
for government. Military theorists contended that sustained air 
raids on city centres would break the will of the people to resist 
enemy encroachment, and with persistent bombing wreaking havoc on 
society, the civilian population would succumb and demand that 
their government capitulate. The military's antidote for aerial 
attacks was a civil defence programme. It was believed that morale 
could be kept strong if people participated in their own protection 
by organizing for the safety of the community.
The Canadian Armed Forces saw civil defence as passive, and 
therefore a political rather than a military responsibility. From 
the military's perspective, civil defence was intended to bolster 
public support for the government's decision to deploy and sustain 
the Armed Forces. It was thus the responsibility of the government 
to boost public morale when faced with the threat of an armed 
attack. To this end, the Department of Pensions and National Health 
(later known as the Department of National Health and Welfare), was 
made responsible for implementing Canada's civil defence programme.
During the Second World War, civil defence was initially 
administered by committee. Without a programme director, civil
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defence had a rather haphazard start, and relations with 
municipalities became strained from unclear funding guidelines and 
restricted access to supplies. Part of the difficulty was caused by 
a conflict of interests. At the federal level, civil defence was 
less about protecting the population than about obtaining and 
sustaining public morale, and thus support for a political decision 
to wage war. The federal government saw its role as providing 
information and used the provincial governments as clearing houses 
for explanatory literature describing the precautionary measures 
for individuals and families.
At the municipal level, civil defence was about building the 
infrastructure that would warn the population of an aerial attack, 
and give assistance in the aftermath of such an attack. However, 
without the financial backing of the federal government, 
municipalities were limited in the type of protection they could 
provide, and both the pre-attack infrastructure of air raid sirens 
and the post-attack emergency rescue services were poorly 
developed. With little support from the federal government, 
municipalities were unable to retain civil defence workers and 
sustain the public's involvement in the programme.
Despite these organizational difficulties, early civil defence 
programs were a political success and public morale in Canada was 
never undermined by air raids. On the two occasions that Canadians 
perceived themselves threatened by an aerial bombing, civil defence 
enrollment increased. When civilian safety was sufficiently 
threatened, civil defence organizations offered the public an
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outlet for relieving their fear, while concomitantly expressing 
support for the war effort.
The development of the atomic bomb, introduced a new weapon of 
mass destruction. Canada, despite having been a wartime participant 
in atomic weapons development and thus knowledgeable enough to 
issue its own information about atomic research, acquiesced to the 
United States on matters of public information about atomic energy. 
The atomic bomb was presented to Canadians as a more powerful and 
efficient conventional bomb, its energy yields compared to those of 
TNT. At first, the atomic bomb's ability to produce and emit 
radioactivity was staunchly denied in the North American press, but 
the number of Japanese victims dying from radiation exposure was 
too overwhelming for the United States to maintain this stance 
without risking a loss of credibility and the United States felt 
obliged to acknowledge that the atomic bomb did produce radiation. 
However, admission to the presence of radioactivity was qualified. 
The United States admitted to the short term emission of thermal 
radiation but denied the existence of residual radiation from 
radioactive fallout. News reports consistently minimized the 
significance of radiation as a new weapon of warfare. Censorship of 
the information concerning the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki "distorted" the postwar debate about the regulation of 
atomic energy in order to favour its continued development as a 
weapon.
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The atomic bomb, as noted by John Holmes, "had swiftly 
radicalized the Canadian view of world order."®!® The public's 
initial response was to support the campaign for international 
control of atomic energy, but the Canadian government accepted the 
right of the United States to retain its monopoly on atomic 
weaponry. Hope for a co-operative commonwealth was squashed with 
the failure of the United Nations International Atomic Energy 
Commission to formulate an international agreement. Press releases 
described recalcitrant Soviet behaviour as the reason why 
international cooperation had failed. This only increased fears of 
renewed hostility. When Igor Gouzenko revealed that Canadians were 
acting as informants for the Soviet Union, the Canadian government 
took advantage of the opportunity to convince the public that 
communism was the main threat to international security. This 
allowed for even closer collaboration with the United States.
By attributing war-like behaviour to the Soviet Union, 
Canadians found themselves in the role of a buffer state between 
two hostile adversaries. They were faced with the uncomfortable 
realization that any new war would make Canada a battlefield in the 
conflict. This fundamentally changed their perception of the world 
order. Increasingly, Canadians were encouraged to rely on the 
United States' atomic arsenal as the best guarantor of 
international peace. The Canadian military regarded opposition to 
nuclear weapons development as "defeatist" and they made deliberate
®!®Holmes, Shaping the Peace, p. 205.
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efforts to associate anti-nuclear sentiment with communist 
sympathies.
Realigning the world into two hostile camps facilitated a 
defence policy based on nuclear deterrence. For nuclear deterrence 
to be successful, one side must convince the other that it has both 
sufficient nuclear capability and the will to use it. To make this 
threat credible required public support, and obtaining this support 
required assurances that a nuclear war was survivable. It was 
through the civil defence programme in Canada in the 1940s and 
1950s that such assurances were provided. To this end, primary 
consideration was given to survival planning, emergency response 
training, and a public education program that would teach people to 
respect and not fear the atomic bomb.
Civil defence countered public opposition to continued nuclear 
weapons development by diminishing, in the public consciousness, 
the perceived hazards of a nuclear war. In civil defence manuals 
the argument of efficiency was used to justify the military's 
prediction of the type of atomic detonation most likely to occur in 
a nuclear war. Underwater detonations and ground bursts were said 
I to be least efficient because their blast effects were less than 
I with above ground explosions. Their rationale complemented the 
nuclear weapons atmospheric testing programme. Similarly, the civil 
I defence emphasis on protection against the air burst also supported 
the military tenet that radiation posed little danger to the 
general population. Early civil defence preparedness measures paid 
scant attention to the radiation produced by atmospheric tests
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because government endorsed civil defence tracts assured people 
that it would dissipate before reaching the ground, and that any 
ground level radioactive contamination which might occur was of a 
temporary nature. Eventually, developments in the delivery systems 
1 for nuclear weapons would nullify the efficiency argument and 
threaten the credibility of the civil defence programme. Survival 
measures became increasingly suspect with the development of the 
intercontinental ballistic missile. Advances in weapon delivery 
implied that nuclear detonations would most likely be ground bursts 
and early civil defence tracts had warned the population of serious 
radioactive harm from ground bursts.
The credibility of the civil defence program was also 
seriously undermined by the hydrogen bomb detonation, code named 
BRAVO because the issue of radioactive fallout called into question 
the validity of municipal survival plans. Emergency survival plans 
envisioned relief workers coming from beyond the periphery of the 
atomic bombs' blast and fire radius. BRAVO declassified the 
occurrence of widespread radioactive fallout. For civil defence 
planners, this knowledge nullified the idea of atomic war as a 
localized disaster as the periphery was no longer restricted to a 
fixed circumference determined by the yield of the detonation. 
Municipal survival plans, such as the one developed by the Fort
iI William civil defence organization, dispersed fire trucks and 
ambulances to just outside city limits with the understanding that 
; the potential target was contained in the industrial core. Without 
clearly defined boundaries, it was nearly impossible to be sure of
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municipal emergency services because workers' survival could not be 
assured. The idea of a localized disaster also corresponded with 
the idea of a limited nuclear war, a type of war undermined by the 
BRAVO test and the realization of widespread, life-threatening 
radioactive fallout.
As the dangers of radioactive fallout became better known the 
federal government stopped encouraging the development of municipal 
survival plans. Increasingly, the civil defence programme 
emphasized the individual's responsibility to provide for his or 
her own survival, but participation in protective measures was 
never widespread. The main difficulty for civil defence officials 
was overcoming the issue of credibility. The public was unwilling 
to write off civil defence because a nuclear attack was 
theoretically possible, but they were not entirely convinced that 
an attack was probable. The watershed crisis for civil defence was 
the 1958 Berlin Crisis, when Khrushchev announced that the Soviet 
Union was ready to turn control of Berlin over to East Germany and 
that the United States would have to re-negotiate road access 
rights to the city. The belief that superpower confrontation was 
now more probable heightened public interest in civil defence 
measures. However, the government had already discarded municipal 
survival plans as being too risky to implement under conditions of 
radioactive fallout. Whereas its civil defence programme had once 
emphasized mutual aid and reciprocity, this now had been replaced 
by a stress on seIf-protection.
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An unintended consequence of this new focus was a greater 
distrust amongst the general population. In the past, Communists 
had been seen as living outside the country, but always trying to 
become the "enemy within" by infiltrating and controlling groups 
and organizations. Now one's neighbour could be the enemy by 
threatening to compromise the safety of the private shelter. 
Inadvertently, civil defence had accentuated social dissention. In 
response to the detrimental effect that private shelter building 
was having on the general population, the federal government 
stopped trying to protect civilians against nuclear war and instead 
concentrated on planning for natural disasters. In the future, 
civil defence measures would only apply to provincial and federal 
levels of government and the military. By the time of the Berlin 
Wall Crisis (1961), people had little confidence in civil defence 
measures, and public pressure to end nuclear weapons testing had 
increased sharply.
The Canadian government explained the public's limited 
interest in personal shelters as a monetary issue. Private shelter 
costs, they said, were too high for families with limited budgets. 
In place of private shelters, therefore, the federal government 
announced a public shelter identification programme to sustain the 
claim that civilians could be protected from radioactive fallout. 
The government identified which public buildings had sufficient 
space to qualify for shelter status but development of public 
shelter spaces never occurred. The only shelters built to protect 
against the short term effects of radioactivity were those
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constructed for the representatives of government. As civil defence 
measures were subjected to increased mockery from the press and 
general population, the civil defence programme retreated from the 
public realm, leaving in its place emergency measures for natural 
disasters. The federal government kept civil defence alive only as 
a sign of continuing collaboration in defence alliances based on 
nuclear weapons.
A civil defence programme was necessary because governments 
had to assure the public that rebuilding society was possible after 
a nuclear attack. The programme, in turn, helped to legitimize the 
doctrine of nuclear deterrence in the public mind. Civil defence 
measures were a sham, but they were indispensable for garnering 
public support for war and for a defence policy based on the 
development and testing of nuclear weapons.
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